The current issue of Mada Al-Carmel electronic magazine “Jadal” addresses the decision to outlaw the Islamic Movement adopted by the Israeli government in the mid of November 2015. The Israeli decision, to politically outlaw the Islamic Movement, is considered a historical turning point in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians in Israel. This is not a compositional argument, it is the precise description of this outlaw to whom understands the essence of this step and what it expresses from the change of this game’s rules between the Arab Palestinian crowds and the Israeli institution, including all its divisions, the political, the judicial, the media and security, all of which were mobilized to support this outlaw. It is an indicator for the change of the game’s rules, though unfair, and which determined the relationship between the Palestinian people and their national institutions on the one hand, and the State of Israeli on the other hand; a change towards new rules that emphasize Israel’s discourse and  colonial behavior and attitude towards the Palestinian masses inside the green line.

The majority of the Israeli society approved the prohibition of the Islamic Movement, in addition to incriminating the Arab political work in general. A recent poll on “The Israeli Democracy scale” published by the Israeli Institute for Democracy clearly reveals the racist attitudes of Israeli fascist and colonial nature against not only the Islamic Movement, but also the Arab masses, their leadership and parties. According to this poll, the entire Palestinian political work may be banned and criminalized. The Israeli political leadership is not only familiar with that approach but it is also in harmony with it and it feeds it. Some of the Israeli Elite opposed this banning for different reasons. Some opposed it for the harm it would cause to whatever is left of the democratic space in Israel, others are against it because it is ineffective, and there are those who opposed it because they believe it would harm the Arab-Jewish relationship. On the other hand, the majority of the Israeli society and its political parties supported it and considered it to be an accomplishment on Netanyahu’s behalf and that is what Netanyahu was looking for, considering his constant political and security failure; taking advantage of the global confusion about the terrorist attacks in Europe and Islamophobia to increase the fear from the Arab masses in general, their leaders and the Islamic Movement in particular.

The Islamic Movement is nor a closed Sufi trend, neither an Othman association. The Islamic Movement is a political-ideological stream that is present in all Arab social stratums and in all its locations. The debating and disagreements with the Islamic Movement on its political and social agenda do not provide moral nor national justification to support the outlaw. This was reflected in the articles published in this editorial, tackling the different aspects of interpretations and reflections of the outlaw on the validity of this argument.

sohadIn her article, attorney Suhad Bshara, provides a judicial-political reading for banning the Islamic Movement through a comparative approach, comparing the banning of al-Ard (the Land) Movement, the differences and the similarities between the two cases. She also reads the outlaw within the general legal-political system which Israel uses as an attempt to incriminate the political activities and work within the Palestinian society in Israel. The writer clarifies that “unlike al-Ard Movement, the Islamic Movement did not only choose not to operate within the parliament, it also chose to operate out of any system in order not to frame itself as a registered body according to any of the Israeli laws. It preferred to operate as a mass religious political movement legally unframed. Despite that, the Islamic Movement was subjected to the same methods of repression by the emergency regulations, in an attempt to impose the constitutional/ideological equation set by the Supreme Court in the case of al-Ard Movement, also in no harmony with the law. Thereby
the Israeli institution takes one further step to expand its oppressive and dominant space towards the Palestinian political action inside the green line.
The columnist Hisham Nafaa offers a political interpretation for the Islamic Movement prohibition in light of the general Israeli policies hishamtowards the Arab masses, emphasizing that this prohibition came in association with the government’s old strategy of reproducing the Arab Palestinian enemy in a systematic manner, seeking this strategy planned goals. He specifically emphasized the decision made by the right-wing government led by Benyamin Netanyahu to outlaw the Islamic Movement, referring to the techniques used by the authority to produce the enemy, as merging fear and terror, in addition to recruiting media in order to make Israeli decisions as dramatic as possible.

The researcher Rana Iseed offers an interpretation of the Islamic Movement’s role in providing social services and social welfare for ranaArab community, mentioning the self-reliant society, which was embodied by the Islamic Movement through the
initiative for establishing non-governmental institutions, which would be responsible for social welfare. She revealed the negative reflections of the embargo on the different social stratums which previously benefited from the services provided by the Islamic Movement, noting that “the government considers providing social services to be “a socio-political threat” rather than a legitimate competitor against the government and its institutions in this regard. Therefore, Iseed believes that there is a relationship –albeit indirect- between the outlaw of the Islamic Movement and its socio-political activities”.
In his article, advocate Alaa’ Mahajneh presents a reading of the relationship between the diversions in the Israeli and Zionist policies, and the prohibition of the Islamic Movement, emphasizing the relationship between the rising of the religious settler approach of the government and the Zionist project, and their seeking to ban alaathe Islamic Movement. Given the recent activities of the Islamic Movement in Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque wherein the Zionist religious colonial stream is attempting to regain religious dominance on Al-Aqsa mosque. The Zionist stream considers the Islamic Movement to be the main obstacle preventing them from accomplishing their ambition.

The writer suggests that “the project of the Islamic Movement, its exceptional activities in Jerusalem and the enforcement of steadfastness and resilience, especially the issue of Al-Aqsa mosque, are the main reasons behind the outlaw decision. Whereas this project collides with the endeavors of the new right-wing to regain the possession of “Temple mount” and the judaization of Jerusalem, in addition to the compulsory displacement of its indigenous Palestinian inhabitants. All of that come as an attempt to establish Jewish religious values within the concept of religious Zionism in the context of its internal struggle over the identity of the State”.

In her study, Dr. Taghreed Yahya-Younis offers a gender approach regarding the Islamic Movement prohibition, where she focuses on the negative aspects of the tghreedIslamic Movement prohibition on the feminist activity within the Islamic Movement, especially that a large feminist stratum has found in the Islamic Movement a political, social and religious framework through which they can play a political and social role, adding to that the opportunity of going out to work and self-actualization on both spiritual and psychological levels. The writer clarifies that “The outlaw impacts affected the whole Palestinian society and the entire Northern Islamic Movement, boys, girls, women and men, individuals and group/s. But it specifically and directly affected the dozens of girls and young women employed by the Movement, in addition to the awareness  raising activists and so many other fields. Thousands of women who receive the Islamic Movement services inside the green line, the West Bank and Gaza have also been affected. The date of the outlaw, to some women, is a determining one with both literal and metaphorical meanings”.

In addition to all of the mentioned previously, the researcher and Professor Saleh Lutfi presents an Islamic interpretation for the Islamic salehMovement outlaw through a cultural approach, considering that the conflict between Israel and the Islamic Movement is not only a political conflict, but also a cultural one; using the Islamic framework manifested in the concept of “Conflict” used by Israel for its relationship with the Islamic Movement, and the concept of “Jostling” adopted by the Islamic Movement for its relationship with Israel. Lutfi suggests: “The nature of advocacy dealt by the Islamic Movement in the gain momentum, and the nature of collision (clash) and conflict dealt by Israel, as the Israeli institution calls for collision because it is easier for it, and it was initially established on that logic, the only logic Israel can understand, through which and by which it can coexist”.

hanenIn the general articles’ section, MK Haneen Zoabi, contributed with an article on the Joint List, which is a continuation of the debate introduced by the previous editorial of “Jadal” magazine. Zoabi approached the Joint List from many different angels, thereby  revealing the political and ideological unlikeness between the components of the Joint List regarding its essence and role, indicating that developing the culture of a national, responsible sober and solid argument among different parties of the Joint List is an important condition, but is not enough for those who want to develop the Joint List as a national strategy. Those who want to achieve that must minimize the differences and deepen the unanimity which develops the Joint List’s political vision. Zoabi also assures that despite all the differences “Unity is more important than the ideological or political agreement, unity will prevent Israel from going alone with any party” of the Joint List’s parties. Unity will prevent Israel from weakening the parties by rating them into “moderate” and “extremist”. Zoabi also suggests that the leadership must repel the incitement and protect its people from it, and this leadership should not change its positions to avoid agitation”.

Finally, the writer and researcher Salameh Keileh provides a summarized and general reading of the Palestinian cause in the present time, and after the outburst of salamathe Arab revolutions in particular, exposing the changes the National Palestinian Scheme went through, and the need to restore the Palestinian National project as a project of national emancipation. He also believes that the Arab revolutions indirectly contribute to the Palestinian cause, contrary to the present illusions. The writer explains that well by saying: “The circumstances were referring to a general tendency to end the Palestinian cause, even before the Arab revolutions; perhaps these revolutions may have led to a different direction, an issue that is not being recognized, or ignored. Wherein the revolutions portend a great coup in the Arab world, which is not in favor of the Zionist State and all the capitalists. It led to the thought of a third intifada by Palestinian youth in Palestine’s various regions.