Palestinians in Palestinian cities in Israel: A settler colonial reality*

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A portion of the Palestinian population in Israel lives in what are known today as “mixed cities”, or cities that were Palestinian prior to the Nakba, before Zionist military forces expelled the majority of their Palestinian inhabitants, turning those who remained into a minority. Conversely, the Jewish inhabitants of these cities—Haifa, Acre, Jaffa,¹ Lydda, and Ramle—and the Jews who flocked to them after 1948, became a clear majority.²

In this article, I refer to the five above-mentioned cities as “mixed cities” in quotation marks because while this term is commonly used today to describe these cities, it disregards their Palestinian history. In fact, the earliest mention of the term “mixed city” was made by a Zionist Jewish Labor politician in the 1940s in an attempt to describe the situation of the Jewish minority living at the time under Palestinian majority rule (Monterescu & Rabinowitz, 2007). Nowadays, Israeli Jews usually refer to these cities as Jewish cities, although the term “mixed cities” is sometimes used in Hebrew by official institutions and in statistical

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¹ Today Jaffa no longer has the status of an independent city. Unlike the other “mixed cities”, it was merged with the Jewish city of Tel Aviv, thus becoming Tel Aviv-Jaffa.

² In addition to these cities, there are two cities that are classified in the official annual Statistical Abstract of Israel as “mixed towns”: Nazaret Illit and Ma’alot-Tarshiha. The town of Nazaret Illit was founded in 1956 as a Jewish “development” town on the lands of Nazareth and its neighboring Arab villages (such as Kufr Kana, Reineh, and Ein Mahel) to geographically overlook Arab Nazareth and preclude its expansion. Huge gaps exist between Nazaret Illit and Nazareth in infrastructure, quality of life, standard of living, and the area of land that falls within their jurisdiction. Because of the shortage of land, especially the lack of land allocated to construction in Nazareth and the neighboring Arab villages, a few Arab residents of Nazareth and neighboring Arab villages moved to Nazaret Illit due its better quality of life. Issues and problems facing these Palestinian residents differ from those faced by Palestinian residents of other “mixed cities” which were originally Palestinian cities. Tarshiha is an Arab village that was merged with Ma’alot (a Jewish town) in mid 1960s. Thereafter, the town became officially known as Ma’alot-Tarshiha. It should be noted that Palestinian residents of the village of Tarshiha had objected to the official merging on a variety of grounds, including the fear that the village’s lands would be confiscated for the benefit of Jewish citizens living in Ma’alot.
compendia to denote these cities as a group. According to Monterescu and Rabinowitz (2007), a systematic review of the daily Arabic-language newspaper *Al-Ittihad* from the year 1944 to 2007 unearths no mention of term “mixed cities”; instead, they were referred to as Arab towns. According to the authors, Palestinians living in the “mixed cities” began to use the expression during the 1990s, resorting to the language of rights to address their needs *vis-à-vis* the state and the municipal authorities of these cities. Although Monterescu and Rabinowitz found that these cities were referred to as Arab cities in *Al-Ittihad*, the memory of them as Palestinian cities and as Palestinian urban spaces became absent from the Palestinian ‘official political discourse’ with the State of Israel for many years. This is, in fact, a manifestation of settler colonial situations, in which the colonial authorities endeavor to erase the history and the memory of the indigenous population by employing mechanisms of continuous surveillance and control. It is worth noting that the memory of these cities as Palestinian cities has recently been revived in the ‘official political discourse’ and in the collective memory of the Palestinian political and cultural elites in Israel, a transformative process that can be described as decolonizing the consciousness of the colonized.

The majority of the Palestinians who remained in the “mixed cities” after 1948 were among their original inhabitants and did not leave during the Nakba. They were, however, displaced to certain neighborhoods within these cities, and hoped to return to their homes once calm had been restored. The other

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3 By ‘official political discourse’, I mean the discourse of the political parties, the Palestinian political institutions, and civil society organization in the articulation of their political demands and the political agenda that these parties and organizations have developed in their relations with the Israeli state. It differs from the ‘unofficial political discourse’, by which I mean that which exists in the private sphere, in internal politics, in the family, and in literature, poetry, and art (Sabbagh-Khoury, 2010).

4 Hasan (2008) notes in this context, that the Palestinian city, its history, and its role disappeared from the collective memory of Palestinians in general. Additionally, she writes that the Palestinian national consciousness was generally founded on the rural memory. Hasan argues that because of the destruction of the cities, the urban life that existed in Palestine became absent in the consciousness of Palestinians in Israel. Instead, their consciousness became rural because they were left without a city and without a collective urban center. Hasan’s research broadly focused on the impact of the destruction of the Palestinian city on the status of women, and on gender relations among the Palestinians in Israel in light of the “absence of the city” and the existence of a rural consciousness.

5 It is worth mentioning that the history of displaced villages was also not collectively present in the ‘official political discourse’ until the mid-1990s (for more details on the evaluation of the collective memory of Palestinians in Israel see Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014).
Palestinian residents of these cities had been displaced from neighboring Arab towns and villages and were not permitted by the Israeli authorities to return to their homes in their original towns (Kamen, 1988). In the 65 years since the Nakba, the number of Palestinians living in the “mixed cities” has increased as young, married Palestinian couples have relocated there from the Arab villages in search of work and better cultural and economic living standards. Many of them have chosen to live in the new Jewish neighborhoods. The Palestinians who live in Arab residential neighborhoods face various crises and forms of oppression as a result of the state’s policies of Judaizing the space and minimizing the number of Arab residents in these cities.

Research conducted by the Galilee Society indicates that in 2010, 34.2% of the Palestinian residents of “mixed cities” were Internally Displaced Persons (The Galilee Society 2011, p. 86). A survey from 2004 indicated that 28.2% of Palestinian residents of “mixed cities” were IDPs, of whom 85.9% had been displaced in 1948, compared to 10.3% who were displaced between 1949 and 1967, 3.2% who were displaced before 1948, and a small percentage, approximately 0.6%, who were displaced after 1967 (The Galilee Society & Mada al-Carmel, 2005, p. 78).

Table no. 1: Palestinian population in the “mixed cities” – 2010

*Numbers in 1000s (unless stated otherwise)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Arab population</th>
<th>Jewish and other population</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Arab population as percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>240.9</td>
<td>268.2</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv-Jaffa</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>388.1</td>
<td>404.3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydda</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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By the end of 2010, the total Palestinian population in the five “mixed cities” (Haifa, Lydda, Acre, Ramle, and Jaffa) had reached approximately 90,280, i.e. around 10.55% of the total population of these cities and 7.2% of the total Palestinian population in Israel. The latter population had grown to around 1,254,600 by the end of 2010, excluding the Arab population of Occupied East Jerusalem (which numbered 296,300) and the Occupied Syrian Golan Heights (which numbered 22,900).7

**Israel’s settler colonial policy toward Palestinian cities and their Palestinian residents**

Israel pursues settler colonial policies towards the Palestinians in Israel. Since the Nakba, the state has striven to erase the presence and history of the Palestinians living within its territory. Wolfe’s (2006) observation that, “settler colonialism is a structure rather than an event” (p. 390), neatly sums up these policies. In my view, this description captures the nature of the Zionist project in Palestine, a project that began with the Zionist movement and continues through the Israeli state. Israel’s general policy toward Arabs living in the “mixed cities” is not different from its policy toward other Palestinians in Israel (Bashir, 1998; Dabit, 2002; Yacobi, 2002; Zureik, 1997): they are politically controlled, the economic foundations of their community have been destroyed, and they have been made dependent in most areas of their lives—like other Palestinians in Israel—on Jewish localities (Bashir, 1998).

Given Israel’s consistent Israeli policy of Judaization in these cities, Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) refer to them as ‘ethnocratic cities’ and describe them as sites of ongoing ethnic conflict and instability (p. 674). Furthermore, despite the similarities between Israel’s policies towards Palestinians living in the “mixed

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cities” and towards Palestinians in Israel in general, what distinguishes the former—apart from the oppression that all Palestinians in the country experience—is the fact that they are an Arab minority living in a society in which the Israeli establishment, via its local institutions, dominates all aspects of public life. In the “mixed cities”, the Jewish establishment dictates the parameters of the public space by defining the contours of the cultural, residential, social, economic, and political landscape. Although the Israeli establishment controls the public space in other non-mixed, all-Arab towns and villages via the planning process, construction, infrastructural maps, budgets, and master plans within their jurisdiction, their Palestinian residents nonetheless enjoy some form of autonomy and control of some local institutions. They maintain a sense of an Arab public sphere, albeit a limited or conditioned one. There is a sense of belonging to the general atmosphere of the town or village, and of an ability to influence the local governance and shape the general landscape. Despite chauvinism and internally-driven, clan-based and sectarian divides, there is some space for collective cultural practices to flourish. This relative autonomy, generally speaking, is unavailable to Palestinians in the “mixed cities”, or in the best-case scenario is difficult to practice. The Israeli establishment pursues an exclusionary policy towards them, attempting to tighten the stranglehold around them, and sometimes (in Acre, for example) displaces them from their homes, with the aim of Judaizing these cities.

The implementation of the settler colonial project in the Palestinian cities seeks to erase their Palestinian history and geography and to turn them into Jewish cities. After the Zionist military organizations expelled the majority of the Palestinian people, the State of Israel began to pursue policies aimed at controlling and Judaizing the space by exercising its control over the land, minimizing residential areas in the Palestinian towns and villages, and, in other cases, by continuing the process of displacement (Masalha, 1997). The various Israeli authorities destroyed the majority of Palestinian villages and displaced their inhabitants, preventing the return of the displaced and seizing their land,
property, and crops. The policy that was pursued in the Palestinian cities differed to some extent, insofar as they were not destroyed. Rather, the houses and buildings they contained were used to settle Jewish immigrants. According to Morris (2000), from the foundation of the Israeli State until 1949, 126,000 (66%) of the 190,000 Jewish immigrants who arrived in Israel were settled in 'abandoned' Palestinian houses in 'mixed cites' (cited in Yacobi, 2002, p. 175). Some of these homes and neighborhoods are still standing, and are either inhabited or under the constant threat of demolition.

The Nakba, which befell the Palestinian people in 1948, was one of the major factors that shaped the collective experience of the Palestinian inhabitants of these major Palestinian cities, as well as their political, social, and economic circumstances. Following the Nakba, the Arab populations of these cities, along with the other members of the Palestinian community who remained in the Arab towns and villages, were placed under Israeli military government. While the military government was imposed on most of the populated Arab towns and villages from 1948 to 1966, it was lifted from the 'mixed cities' in 1949, except in Acre, where it was lifted in June 1951 (Kaufman, Kabha, Ozacky-Lazar, & Baumel, 2007, pp. 314-315). One of the goals behind the imposition of military government was to prevent the Palestinians living in the Arab towns from returning to their original homes (Jiryis, 1976; Masalha, 1997; Masalha, 2003). In addition, the military government aimed to concentrate the Palestinian population in cities within isolated areas, as demarcated by the Israeli authorities in each city. This policy of separation explains the contemporary residential distribution in these cities, where the majority of the Palestinian residents live in separated neighborhoods. The concentration and isolation of

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8 With some exceptions, such as the village of Ein Haud, whose Palestinian homes and properties were retained after the Nakba and converted into an artistic village for Israeli Jews that is called, in Hebrew, Ein Hod (Slyomovics, 1998). On the demolition of Palestinian villages, see Golan, 2001.

9 In this context, Golan indicates the need for buildings in the cities and their periphery due to the large number of Jewish immigrants who settled in cities compared to those who settled on Palestinian village land. For more details on the process of taking over Palestinian towns by various Israeli institutions, see Golan, 2001.

10 The military government and the imposition of military rule were confined to those areas in Israel that had a majority Palestinian population and were not applied in Jewish areas, despite the fact that laws themselves did not overtly distinguish between Jewish and Arab citizens (Jiryis, 1976; Masalha, 2003, pp. 150-156).
Palestinian residents was part and parcel of the general Israeli policy of separating off the Palestinian minority, who remained in their homeland after the Nakba, from the Jewish population (Yacobi, 2002; Zureik, 1979). From this perspective, these cities are not ‘mixed’ cities in the common sense of the word, since most Arabs and Jews there live in almost separate neighborhoods and study in separate schools, with the exception of a small percentage of Arab pupils who study in Jewish schools. Social and cultural interactions between the Palestinian and Jewish residents of these cities likewise remain limited. Thus, the term ‘mixed cities’ refers to the mere fact that Arabs and Jews reside in the same city, but does not reflect their present-day cultural, economic, or political realities of these cities.

Since its establishment, Israel has striven to prevent Palestinian geographical contiguity within its borders. This policy stems not only from its fears of potential demands by Palestinians in Israel for geographical autonomy, but also from a desire to inhibit the political, social, economic and cultural reconstruction of the Palestinian community as a national group. Geographical contiguity has been precluded by several means, such as establishing Jewish settlements in the areas between Arab towns and villages. Although the stated objectives of the military government did not include preventing continuity between the various sections of the remaining Palestinian community within Israel, the application of ‘military government’ led to the de facto isolation of the Arab residents of the ‘mixed cities’ from the rest of the Palestinian population in the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Naqab. Such isolation was less acute in Acre and Haifa due to their proximity to the Galilee region, where the opportunity for political, social, and cultural interaction with the Arab population in the Galilee reduced the intensity of their isolation. Although the military government ended in 1966, its impact continues to be felt to some extent even today, particularly regarding the weakened connections between the Palestinians in Israel living in the Galilee, the Triangle, the Naqab, and the coastal areas, and those Palestinians living in the ‘mixed cities’. Naturally it also continues to affect the lives of the Palestinian citizens of Israeli living in the ‘mixed cities’.
At the levels of both national and local leadership, Israel implements its policy in all areas populated by Palestinians in Israel by drafting national plans for the state as a whole, and regional plans, such as its plans for Judaizing the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Naqab (Khamaisi, 2006; Masalha, 2003), and through the planning and building laws (Khamaisi, 2006). Israel also implements a policy of Judaizing the space vis-à-vis some Palestinians living in the ‘mixed cities’ with the aim of reducing the number of their Palestinian residents, and sometimes of displacing them to neighboring Arab villages, employing various means to impede their development, such as preventing them from renovating homes that are on the verge of collapse. For example, the restrictive policies pursued against the remaining Palestinian residents in Acre have led some of them to leave the city for nearby villages such as Makr, Judeida, and Kafr Yasif. Yacobi (2002) reports similar policies of inhibiting development and encouraging Arab citizens to leave their places of residence in Lydda (p. 183).

Some experts assert that Israel is pursuing a policy of ‘cleansing the space’ based on ideological considerations, coupled with the exercise of its control over the land, the population, and its citizens’ places of residence. The state justifies its policies of geographic division, land ownership, and state confiscation of land on the pretext of the ‘public interest’ or ‘security needs’ (Zureik, 2001).

Additional consequences of Israel’s settler colonial policies include the altering of Palestinian landmarks via various means, such as changing the Arabic names of streets, demolishing the houses of Palestinian refugees and IDPs, and transforming Palestinian areas into Jewish neighborhoods, thereby Judaizing them and erasing their Palestinian history. Such is the case, for instance, in the artists’ quarter in Jaffa and in the Wadi al-Salib neighborhood in Haifa, where the Israel Land Administration (ILA) seeks to demolish large numbers of Arab

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11 In Israel’s political discourse, the concept of ‘security’ is used in the contexts of land control, IDPs and refugees, and ‘achieving’ a Jewish majority. Rouhana (1997) states that the security threat is no longer exclusively limited to the military sphere; rather, the ruling political elite employ the term in social and political contexts, due to its mobilization capacities within Jewish society in Israel, which is deeply inherent to the origins of establishing the Jewish state in Palestine, in colonizing the lands of the Palestinian people, and expelling the majority of them. When using ‘security’ to justify their policies or actions, those elites draw upon the tragic history of the Ashkenazi Jews in European countries, in terms of the Holocaust, persecution in Europe, and anti-Semitic tendencies towards them.
buildings whose inhabitants were expelled during the Nakba in 1948 in order to construct residential homes, buildings and workshops for Israeli Jewish in their place.

Palestinians in the ‘mixed cities’ share the same economic, political, and organizational city space as their Jewish inhabitants; however, different levels of services are provided to the Arab areas of these cities. This issue intersects with the general Israeli policy of imposing restrictions on the residents of some neighborhoods in an attempt to induce them to move away. In some cases, the Israeli establishment encourages Palestinian citizens to leave certain cities by offering mortgages to those who show willingness to relocate to an Arab village, in order to accelerate the process of expelling them from these cities (Bashir, 1998).

It is important to note that no detailed demographic information on the Arabs living in “mixed cities” is made available by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, including in its annual publication on Local Authorities in Israel (which provides detailed demographic and socioeconomic data on towns and villages). This can be interpreted as an attempt to conceal the harsh living conditions of the Arab populations of these cities and to portray them as Jewish cities with no significant Palestinian presence. A detailed data on the Palestinians in each “mixed city” may reveal a collective or representational presence that the Israeli establishment is currently trying to suppress.

The housing conditions of Arabs in the “mixed cities” and the legal status of residents’ property

Arab areas in the “mixed cities” are typically overcrowded and contain poor housing (Bashir, 1998; Zureik, 1997). Some houses in these areas are on the verge of collapse and some roads are unpaved and hazardous. The municipalities of these cities have neglected houses in Arab neighborhoods, with the result that deteriorating conditions have turned some into poverty-stricken
Although there are some Arab representatives in these municipalities, their influence is limited and their role is marginal. Arab municipal councilors are excluded from planning processes, in a manner consistent with the state’s policy of excluding Palestinians from public planning and with the state’s general stance that the presence of Arabs impedes the development of the Jewish demographic space (Jabareen, 2001).

As noted above, most of the Palestinians who remained in the Palestinian cities were expelled from their homes and forced out of their original neighborhoods for various reasons. Under the “Emergency Regulations of Absentees’ Property of 1948” and in accordance with the “Absentees’ Property Law of 1950,” the state considered Arab property in “mixed cities” to be “Absentees’ Property”, unless the owners of the property were able to prove they were not absentees in accordance with the definition contained in the law. However, Arab citizens have rarely succeeded in proving this in the Israeli courts (Jiryis, 1976; Munayer, 1998). Some of the Palestinians who remained in these cities moved into the homes of refugees who had been expelled from the city. They often had to pay rent to the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property, but were not recompensed for the original homes that they were expelled from in the same city.

The Israeli authorities assign ownership of the majority of Arab houses and real estate in the “mixed cities” to housing associations affiliated with governmental institutions, invoking several laws to divest Arab citizens of the property or to impose restrictions on its use. The largest dispossession operation of land and property belonging to Palestinian refugees and IDPs, including the residents of the “mixed cities”, was achieved through the Absentees’ Property Law of 1950 (Masalha, 2003).

Munayer (1998) gives an example of the process of appropriating Palestinian property in the city of Lydda, where land and buildings were registered in the name of the Office of the Custodian of Absentee Property, which became known as the Office of Abandoned Property. After this office seized the properties, it

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12 The Municipality of Acre categorized the Old City of Acre as having one of the highest population densities in the world; approximately half of the families living in the Old City (which is inhabited by Arab citizens) live crowded together in a single room, with an average of eight persons per room (Zureik, 1997).
began to refurbish them and make them suitable for habitation, and then to lease them out for a symbolic rental fee to families of Jewish immigrants. The land and property of the Palestinian IDPs living in Lydda was likewise considered to be Absentees’ Property, despite the fact that some of its owners had remained in the city. The Israeli authorities claimed not to know the identities of the owners of this land and property, and argued that the burden was on the owners, if they could be found, to prove their ownership by furnishing the relevant paperwork. This requirement was not feasible for the people who had been displaced from the city of Lydda for several reasons. Some of them had been unable to bring these documents with them during their expulsion. In other cases, Jewish immigrants had moved into their houses, the documents had been lost, and their owners were unable to locate them. Furthermore, even in those cases where displaced persons from Lydda had been able to provide the required documentation and certificates for the payment of governmental taxes and to prove their ownership of their land and homes before the courts, by the time they had done so, several months had passed since Jewish immigrants had taken possession of their homes, creating a \textit{fait accompli} (Munayer, 1998, pp. 143-144).

Approximately 70% of the Arab residents of the “mixed cities” rent their houses from housing associations affiliated with Israeli governmental institutions. In general, the leasing agreements made with Arab residents do not permit renovation or home improvements, except with prior approval of the housing association; requests submitted by Arab citizens are frequently rejected. In addition, with the absence of financial support, tenants find it difficult to save the necessary funds for this purpose. Consequently, the housing conditions of the majority of the Arab population in the “mixed cities” have declined to their current poor state. Once these housing units become unsuitable for habitation, the Ministry of Housing usually seals them up or demolishes them. Sometimes the housing association refurbishes the buildings or demolishes them and then constructs new residences for Jewish immigrants in their place. There were many high profile cases of this practice in the early 1990s, particularly in the city of Acre following the influx of large numbers of Jewish immigrants from the
former Soviet Union (Bashir, 1998). It should be noted that what is occurring in Acre is just an example of what is also happening in some of the other “mixed cities”.

**Civil society, political parties, and the revival of the Palestinian cities**

Due to the poor living conditions of Palestinian citizens living in the “mixed cities”, and the deliberate absence of state institutions, over the last three decades civil society has begun to act through the existing associations in these cities.\(^{13}\) These associations operate in the “mixed cities” in various fields, including education; housing; law; the renovation of old houses; cultural activities (including music and theater); feminist action; research; preserving the Palestinian identity of the space; and submitting alternative planning proposals to those drafted by the planning institution. These associations offer assistance to Arab citizens in various areas, by helping them to formulate their requests to governmental and judicial institutions, and attempting to challenge plans for the spatial and cultural Judaization plans of these cities.

In addition, some organizations are working to revive the memory of these cities, as Palestinian cities, following their absence from the ‘official political discourse’ and from the collective consciousness of the Palestinians in Israel for various reasons that are beyond the scope of this article. As part of their efforts to revive the collective memory of the Nakba and its consequences for the destruction of the space and culture of Palestinians in the Palestinian towns and villages, groups and organizations are now mobilizing to commemorate these cities as Palestinian cities in the collective consciousness in various ways. Examples of their activities are arranging tours to Palestinian neighborhoods in these cities in order to learn their history, and organizing commemorative days to mark their establishment. These activities are part of wider Palestinian activism for the revival and archiving of Palestinian history, and restoration of the memory of

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\(^{13}\) For example, the Social Development Committee (SDC) of Arabs in Haifa; the Committee of the Halisa neighborhood in Haifa; al-Yater Association for Social and Cultural Promotion in Acre; Acre Women’s Association—Dar al-Tifl al-Arabi; the elected Islamic Committee in Jaffa; the League of Arabs of Jaffa; al-Sabar Association, which is active in Lydda and Ramle; and other associations and civil society organizations.
Palestinian towns and villages through various cultural events, including leading visits to uprooted towns and villages and publishing books on their history. Similar visits have begun to be made to the Arab neighborhoods of the “mixed cities”.

In addition, the last few years have seen the growing presence of Arab political parties in the “mixed cities”, where they have challenged Israel’s policy of demolishing Arab houses designated as ‘unauthorized’. The Arab parties are becoming increasingly interested in the issues and conditions of the Palestinian residents of these cities. The discourse on the history of these cities as Palestinian cities is also gaining traction among the leadership of some the political parties, as evidenced by the campaigns for the October 2013 local municipality elections, which raised the history of these cities as Palestinian cities.

Since the end of the 20th century, several books on the history of Palestinian cities have been published within a series by the Institute for Palestine Studies under the general title Series of Palestinian Cities (see, for example, Ghanayim, 2005; Munayer, 1998; Saied, 2008; Seikaly, 1997), an area of study that had been relatively unexplored (Hasan, 2008). Mada al-Carmel—Arab Center for Applied Social Research contributed to this Palestinian endeavor by producing an issue on Jaffa for the Journal of Palestine Studies, which was published in Winter 2013 under the title of “Yaffa (Jaffa): Roots, Home, and Homeland”.

Conclusion

In this article, I have offered a glimpse of the experiences of those Palestinians in Israel who live in Palestinian cities that have come to be known as “mixed cities”,

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15 See, for example, interview with the fourth nominee in the NDA list for the local municipality elections in Haifa on website of Bokra. (2013, October 11). “Nominee Afnan Eghbaria to Bokra: The importance of the historical narrative of Haifa.

in order to cast light on the difficult living conditions they experience as a result of Israel’s policies of settler colonialism. The Israeli establishment constantly strives to exclude Palestinians from these cities and to make their continued existence there difficult. In addition, I addressed Israel’s ongoing policy of Judaizing these cities, of exercising its control over them, and its attempts to remove Palestinians from them and erase them from their history. Because these cities have been absent as Palestinian cities from Palestinian ‘official political discourse’ and collective consciousness, since the advent of the Nakba, so the role that these Palestinian cities had begun to play—along with the Palestinian middle classes that lived in them prior to the Nakba—in building and enriching the Palestinian national and cultural identity, was also absent for many years after 1948. I further contended that there has been a change in this regard. The Palestinian history of these cities has begun to reappear in the ‘official political discourse’ thanks to the work of the Arab political parties and civil society organizations active in some of these cities.

Finally, this article could not broadly address the lives of Palestinians in “mixed cities” in detail, in areas such as construction, education, culture, living standards, housing, etc., a task that would require several more exhaustive studies evaluating each city separately. Rather, this article has attempted to highlight some of the common factors that unite the “mixed cities”, while remaining attuned to differences in the conditions of the Palestinian residents living in each of them.

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