70 Years Of Nakbah

Mada al-Carmel
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70 years of Nakbah

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70 Years Of NAKBAH
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Introduction

Mohanad Mustafa

Dr. Mohanad Mustafa, Mada al-Carmel’s General Director.
The return to 1948 has been a defining moment in the political discourse of the Palestinians in Israel. The idea that the Nakbah is continuing, was not only a declarative idea, to ensure the continuation of the struggle for the attainment of rights in the homeland. Rather it is an ontological idea that reflects reality. The Palestinians in Israel continue to live the reality created by the Palestinian Nakbah. They are part of the Palestinian cause; as the Nakbah is continuing in every location and domain in the lives of the Palestinians; the confiscation of land; the constriction of their space; the legislation of laws in an attempt to suppress their historical narrative; adoption of policies aimed at restricting their political action, etc. ...

Reopening the 1948 case in the Palestinian political discourse, confirmed that the issues of the Palestinians in Israel are part of the Palestinian cause and they are part of the Palestinian people. The severing that took place in 1948 between them and the other parts of the Palestinian people, and their exclusion from the Palestinian National Project, no longer has a place in their political reality and discourse. This is not because it is has become politically possible, but because Palestinian’s status and future in Israel cannot be dealt with without returning to 1948. The return to 1948, the year of severing and separation, has contributed to the
development of a political discourse and a new paradigm of thought among the Palestinians in Israel. The return to 1948 seeks to understand Israel within the framework of a colonial Zionist settlement project. While remaining in 1967 frames the conflict as a struggle for civil rights, which links the establishment of a Palestinian State within the 1967 borders, with the rights of the Palestinians inside Israel. Even though, historical developments and objective analysis of Israeli policies, prove that there is no connection between the two issues. The question of the Palestinians in Israel, at least, is the issue of 1948, not 1967.

In returning to 1948, the Palestinians in Israel, realized the danger of Jewish statehood on them, and on the Palestinian National Project. No other Palestinian group is as aware of the gravity of the meaning of Jewish statehood on the National Project, as the Palestinians in Israel. The political project of the Palestinians in Israel began with the premise that recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, the moral acceptance of the Zionist project, with the abolition of the Right of Return and the displaced; the acceptance of the Zionist narrative, and finally, their reflection on the project of equality, collective rights and the Right to Self-Determination of the Palestinians in Israel, are a source of danger to the overall National Project. The recognition of Israel as a Jewish State leads to emptying the citizenship discourse of its meaning and mechanisms, restricting it to the demand for morsels of rights. It also constitutes a barrier to the Right of Self-Determination of the Palestinians in Israel, their recognition as a national group and their collective rights. The return
of the Palestinians to 1948 as a severing point from the Palestinian people, does not date their existence in their homeland to this year, rather, it is an attempt to reconnect what was severed, and join what was cut. This means that their historical memory does not begin with 1948, when they received Israeli citizenship. Their memory dates back to pre-1948, by recognizing that the Zionist project in Palestine, is a colonization project. Returning to 1948, does not mean that their identity began to form in 1948. It means that their identity is part of a historical process that began before 1948 and continues to be formed. Therefore, returning to 1948 is not a return of yearning, political nostalgia, or luxurious thought, it is a real return. At this point, the Palestinian can realize his/her collective identity, understand his/her national question, and individual identity. The return does not mean starting at 1948, but rather seeks to connect what was severed in 1948 in consciousness, discourse and identity.

This book strives to deepen the debate on the idea that the “Nakbah is continuing.” It seeks to contribute to position of the Palestinians in Israel in the framework of return to 1948, to achieve a deeper understanding of their reality and a serious analysis of their relationship with the State.

The book contains six articles: The first article, a preface to the book, was written by Dr. Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, and deals with the idea that the 1948 war on the Palestinians in Israel is continuing with other mechanisms, but ultimately serves the goals of that war. Dr. Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder discusses Palestinian research in the context of colonialism, focusing
on Palestinian research on Palestinian women in Israel. The writer Antwan Shulhut discusses the development of the Palestinian cultural scene inside Israel since 1948 to date, with a comprehensive reading of this scene and monitoring of the most important changes that have occurred and the challenges facing it. Dr. Enaya Banna-Jeries’ article discusses the issue of planning and construction, and the Israeli policies aimed at constricting the Palestinians’ space. These are policies that were never disconnected from the goals of Zionism before, during and after 1948. Dr. Mansour Nasasra then presents an article on the Naqab, which embodies the features of Israeli policies as they are reflected in the previous chapters: the continuation of the war against the Palestinian presence in the Naqab; the confiscation of land, the Judaization of the place and of Palestinian awareness there, through attempts to separate them from the rest of Palestinian society; the planning and expropriation policies practiced in the Naqab, which are an expression of a colonial settlement system with distinction. In the last chapter, Dr. Ibrahim Farid Mahajneh addresses an important issue that has not been sufficiently discussed in the past, which is the development of Israeli social policies toward the Palestinians in Israel. Policies that, according to the author, represent policies of contempt and disrespect for the Palestinians in Israel.

Mohanad Mustafa
Editor

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War by Other Means Against the Palestinians in Israel

Areej Sabbagh-Khoury

Dr. Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, Assistant Professor Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the Hebrew University and Research fellow at Mada-al-Carmel- The Arab Center for Applied Social Research
War by Other Means Against the Palestinians in Israel (*)

“Politics is the continuation of war by other means”, Michel Foucault wrote in “Society Must Be Defended” (2003), reversing Clausewitz’s well-worn dictum. Foucault’s point is that there is a continuous battle of sorts that takes place in times of peace, and the public space that hosts civil society, with all its depth, substance, and methods of influence, is the ultimate field of battle. Foucault asserts the importance of replacing the juridical discourse, with the discourse of war. According to him, the law and official political agreements are imbued with violence and the modern “achievements” of establishing governmental political institutions, only serve to obscure a continuous infrastructure of war that is inherent to such institutions. Utilizing this interpretation, I hope to show how the war waged on Palestinians in Israel, rages on.

The 1948 war has not ended for Palestinians from within the borders of Israel established by the 1949 armistice (the so-called Green Line). The establishment of Israel and the cease-fire agreements with neighboring Arab countries set the stage for “the continuation of war by other means” through the imposition of Israeli law over the Palestinian population.

(*). A similar version of this article was previously published by Jadaliyya in 2012.
This war, that started with Zionist colonization in the pre-state era, lies within the system of Israeli citizenship.

Following the establishment of the Israeli State, this war was waged through the enactment of legislation to enable the conquest of as much Palestinian land as possible; attempts to forbid Palestinian internally displaced persons (IDPs) from returning to their homes even as they remained in Israel; and the deportation of residents of some villages even after the armistice. One such case of the latter is the villages of Iqrit and Biram. This war has been quite explicit: from 1948-66, Palestinian-populated areas were governed through a military government inside Israel. After the military government ended, the implementation of policies discriminating against Palestinian citizens in the political, social, and economic fields continued. Among other Israeli ambitions, this “war” sought the Judaization of entirely or predominantly Arab areas. Since 2000, following the start of the second intifada, these practices have only escalated, and there has been an unprecedented pursuit of aggressive legislation targeting Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Most academic literature that examines Palestinian citizens’ collective activism and organization, attributes their activity to reaction against State policy. However, if we analyze the dynamic of the relationship between the Israeli State and its Palestinians citizens, starting in the mid-nineties after the Oslo agreement, we notice a central shift in this dynamic. Israeli’s settler colonial policy toward Palestinian citizens took on a much more reactive character. This is due to a shift in political discourse and modes of organization among
indigenous Palestinians in Israel, taking place on two main levels. First, the events of the Nakbah, the Palestinian catastrophe that coincided with the foundation of Israel, have become front and center in Palestinian political discourse. Until the mid-nineties, any discussion of the Nakbah was depressed in the public sphere. Second, Palestinians have expanded efforts to challenge the Jewish identity of the State and to demand that it become a State for all of its citizens.

If Israel has succeeded, to a certain extent, to portray the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank as “terrorists”, it has had no such success in conjuring the same image of the Palestinians in Israel, who operate within the framework of limited citizenship, a “settler colonial citizenship” (Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014), to challenge the Jewish hegemony. This brings us back to politics as war, and helps us understand the war by Israel against its own citizens, waged through a variety of arms and even during times of peace, to silence the political discourse that heightens Palestinian history and Nakbah in proposing solutions for the settler colonial conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Over the last two decades, the Palestinians in Israel have organized to advocate the right of Palestinian refugees and IDPs to return to their displaced villages and towns. Activists have worked to rebuild the Palestinian collective memory associated with the Nakbah. In 1998, ADRID-Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel collaborated with the High Follow-up Committee (HFC) to organize the “March of the Return” in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Nakbah.
Since then, every year on Israel’s Independence Day, this march highlights the other side of the independence of Israel: the Nakbah (disaster) of the Palestinian people. Among the march’s participants are ADRID, the HFC, members of certain political parties, NGOs, and independent citizens.

The commemoration of the Nakbah has become a fulcrum of Palestinian discourse in Israel, and the return of IDPs and refugees has become a central issue since 1998. This development followed a multigenerational absence of collective action or any discourse claiming the right of return for refugees. As a response to this shift in discourse, in 2011, Israel enacted the “Nakbah Law”, which limits funding for any organization that commemorates the Nakbah. This law illustrates the serious fear the Israeli State has of the revival of discussion of the Nakbah and Palestinian history. The Nakbah Law followed the “Ensuring Rejection of the Right of Return Law- 2001”, passed by the Knesset to prohibit the return of refugees to areas located within the borders of Israel, except by approval of an absolute majority of Knesset Members. While it is true that the 2001 law concurred with the entry of the Israeli government into negotiations with Palestinian Authority (PA) on a permanent solution, it is important to understand this legislation in the context of the overarching Israeli reaction to the shift in the Palestinian discourse in Israel.

The reactive Israeli State Policy is also conspicuous in the escalation, frequency, and force of political persecution of Palestinian leadership in Israel, showing concern and anxiety about the new discourse that rejects the Jewish identity of
the State. In its last two terms, the Knesset has enacted laws restricting the rights of Palestinian citizens and consolidating the Jewish character of the State.

One salient question this raises is: why now? Some would attribute this uptake in legalistic repression to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the Israeli demand that it be recognized internationally as a Jewish State; I tend to agree with this view, but it is not sufficient on its own. I believe it is important to see these practices in the broader context of the historic and evolving relationship between Palestinians citizens and the State of Israel. Before the emergence of the National Democratic Alliance party in the mid-nineties, there was no political discourse calling for the transformation of Israel into a State of all of its citizens. That trend has changed. If we review documents issued in the last several years by any of several Palestinian organizations, we find a clear image of what Palestinians in Israel expect of their relationship with the State of Israel. We find that these documents reject the exclusive Jewish character of the State and demand democracy and equality.

The Knesset responded to this shift as it did to the revival of discourse about the Nakbah: by attacking civil society. Most of its fire has been aimed at Palestinian NGOs—especially those trying to break the taboo (i.e., the legal prohibition) of challenging the Jewish identity of the State—but there has also been an attack on some Jewish NGOs for equal rights and anti-occupation advocacy as well, though those attacks take on a different character. This concentrated attack attempts to withhold funding from associations or research
centers that publicly challenge the Jewish character of State. Instead of acknowledging the reality of the Nakbah and trying to resolve the conflict on the basis of historical reconciliation and democratization, we are witnessing an ongoing attempt by Israel to silence the history of the Palestinian Nakbah.

To refer back to Foucault, this policy of Israel to exclude and discriminate, bind and gag, constitutes the continuation of the war on the Palestinian citizens who managed to remain in Israel. Israel wages this war to get them to accept its authority and recognize the State as Jewish, a character the majority of Palestinians have rejected since the State’s establishment in 1948. This rejection has come to be the focus of the collective discourse, and manifests as raised voices in the battle over history and truth, over their existence in their homeland, and the demand of the right of return of refugees.

Despite the ever-increasing effort of the Israeli regime to restrict the ability of Palestinians to discuss their history freely, they continue to make new strides. On the sixty-fourth anniversary of the Nakbah led by the High Follow-up Committee, Palestinians all over Israel participated in a general strike to commemorate Nakbah Day. Such a move has never happened before, and it signals that the important issues of the Nakbah and the Right of Return among Palestinians in Israel continue to penetrate Israeli political society.
References


The Dissipation of the Green Line in Palestinian Women’s Research in Israel: Production of Ethical Knowledge and Research Justice

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder

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The Dissipation of the Green Line in Palestinian Women’s Research in Israel: Production of Ethical Knowledge and Research Justice

The last decade has witnessed a change in the process of production of research knowledge on Palestinian women in Israel, particularly from a critical perspective that challenges the knowledge structures that have been formed so far. This change came as a result of the increase in the number of female Palestinian researchers from both sides of the Green Line and from outside it. These researchers have presented and are offering a new perspective related to the broader Palestinian context, located under a continuous occupation, and is labeled as Settler Colonialism by literature.

My main argument in this short article is that gender research conducted in Israeli academic institutions, by Israeli researchers, has not yet penetrated the “Israeli” barrier. Many researchers continue to place Palestinian women within the “Israeli” theoretical framework. They are placed as part of a discourse that classifies them separately from the rest of the Palestinian people, who were divided by the Nakbah in 1948 and then the Naksah (setback) in 1967, and also divides them by the “Israeli” feminist discourse. This chapter produces Research Injustice, a term I propose to develop in this article. Through it, I call upon all those who conduct research on the
Palestinians in general, and Palestinian women in particular, to produce “ethical knowledge” that brings research justice to the women, who, until now, have been researched from an “Israeli” perspective. To exemplify my argument, I will address the feminist field I have been researching for more than a decade; the Palestinian community in the Naqab. I will discuss the position of the Palestinian researcher and her responsibility to produce “ethical knowledge” about the society she is researching, and from which she came. In the end, I would suggest a link between two theoretical frameworks: Intersectionality and Settler Colonialism, as an unavoidable link to the achievement of research justice and the production of “ethical knowledge” in Palestinian gender research.

*Therefore, this article is divided into three sections:*

1. My identity as a Palestinian researcher struggling for the existence of her identity and the identities of the subjects she is researching.

2. The genealogy of research on the Bedouin Palestinian women in the Naqab, the research community I have been studying for a decade. In addition to the shift in the discourse on Palestinian gender research from the 1960s to the present day.

3. Explanation of the inevitable linkage between the two theoretical frameworks: Intersectionality & Settler Colonialism, as necessary frameworks to enrich the research, primarily to produce what I call “ethical knowledge,” an additional term I propose.
A. The First Issue: My Identity as a Researcher

Firstly, when I start researching Palestinian women in the Naqab, I could not ignore my identity as a Palestinian woman and researcher, coming from a society that has been oblivious to critical public discourse and academic discourse over many years. The starting point for thinking about identity is my national and civic identity, which have formed two very important components in the process I have experienced as a researcher in the Israeli academic institutions, as well as in the research on Palestinian women. Here, I ask; what is my role as a Palestinian researcher in the Israeli academic institutions? What knowledge do I want to produce?

I argue that my position as an indigenous Palestinian researcher, with national, civic and gender identities, on the various coordinates of the margins and privileges, does not free me from my moral duty to produce knowledge for gender and research justice. After a decade of research and public activity in the community in which I work, I see that I have the task of producing “ethical” knowledge, that in practice, brings research justice to the community I am researching.

The production of ethical knowledge requires me to develop a sensitivity to the oppression of the occupation and its impact on my community, and to pay attention to the voices that have been silenced. The integration in my research of the feminist and moral agenda is part of my mission as an activist and researcher. Therefore, when I conduct research, I put on the hat of indigeneity and the hat of feminism, which
defies the colonialist-orientalist discourse. Consequently, my writing consists of the indigenous and feminist angles.

When I began my career as a young researcher in the late 1990s, research on the Palestinians in the Naqab in general, and on the Palestinian Bedouin women in particular, was still in its beginnings. The research was conducted in the field of orientalism and the modernist conceptual framework, as part of the power relations inherent in western knowledge production on the indigenous, which turned them into the “other”.

Research of the indigenous, as shown by indigenous researchers (Smith, 1999), must formulate a research task for itself, and also set out ethical tasks to dismantle the bilateral power relations between the East and West. Relations that formed indigenous identities subjected to colonialist domination for decades. Thus, the main task of researchers on the indigenous is to reveal colonialism from the history of the indigenous people, rewrite it from an indigenous perspective, and analyze it through non-bilateral frameworks. In particular, dismantle the substantialism, which was built up through cultural, religious, and collective indicators that were incomplete and devoid of diversity. My feminist identity requires the dismantling of the depictions imposed on Muslim / Palestinian / Bedouin women and providing a platform for their feminism and ways to confront them, as well as deconstruct our essential identities as feminists. In order to produce ethical knowledge, we must not disregard, in our research, the reality of the occupation and its domination over all areas of Palestinian life within...
the Green Line and beyond. As ignoring the occupation is a separation from reality.

However, do the Israeli academic institutions provide us with space for expression? Or should we apologize and use political tact?

Sami Samooha raises this question about the role of the sociologist in the Israeli academic institution. He suggests that sociologists in Israel should adopt a common social science school of thought that “seeks to penetrate the walls of the academic institution and be relevant [...] and expand the role of sociology in the lives of the public and the State” (Samooha, 2008, p. 260). Yehouda Shenhav takes one step further and demands that the researcher be identified as an intellectual, not only as a position, but as an action: “He/she is a human with standing in a certain field (scientific, academic, literary, poetry, law), but he/she expresses his/her position in another field, political or ethical”. According to him, “the real intellectual, is like a traveler who diagnoses and motivates” (Shenhav, 2008, p. 269). That is, the identity of the researcher is an important component in the development of the discourse, and it is worth asking ourselves where do we meet our identity in the knowledge we produce?

Unfortunately, the academic institution does not always allow for the expression of moral opinions, and the examination of ethical questions, so as not to interpret the knowledge as biased. The campaigns of intimidation and silencing of voices, that pressure the researchers, may lead, according to Shenhav, to self-censorship (Ibid).
Shenhav adds that political and ethical questions have always been “red flags” of scientific and intellectual activity. Therefore, he demands defending morality in the face of the neutrality of sociology. “Intellectuals’ impartiality or scientific objectivity leaves them outside the circle of discussion on the important questions of the phase”. Objectivity, obtained in exchange for the absolute separation between authorities, becomes what Theodor Adorno called Sodom’s bed of “consciousness” (Ibid).

B. The Second Issue: The Genealogy of Palestinian Gender Research in the Naqab

In order to understand the research path I undertook as a Palestinian researcher, who was the first to receive a doctorate in her community, at a time when women were a minority in universities. We must understand the research genealogy of the evolution of gender discourse in the research on Palestinian women in the Naqab. Therefore, I will present the three stages of the development of gender research on Bedouin women in the Naqab from the 1960s to the present day. This gender discourse is not separate from the settlement colonialist political situation (the political field), which designed and fed the research discourse (field) in several directions:

1. The discourse of bilateral modernization, which developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and produced substantialist, bilateral and fixed identities of the “Bedouin woman.” This discourse was based on the cultural context,
which emphasized that the move to the permanent residential communities, is a modernization process in which the “Bedouin refused to integrate” or to integrate their women into it (Abu Ajaj and Ben-David, 1988; Ben-David, 2000; Hoz and Keinan, 1997; Kressel, 1992). This produced a women’s unified/homogeneous identity discourse, a traditional identity that refuses to change or develop as a result of its oppressive culture.

This discourse was based on what I call a “fragmented axis”, one that focuses on the “specificity” of Bedouin culture, on the distinction of the Bedouin woman. It is fragmented, because it is based on a discourse that gives specificity to the Bedouin, thus separating them from the rest of the Palestinian and Muslim society in Israel. This discourse empties the Bedouin identity, especially that of women, from its national identity (as Palestinians), from its religious (as Muslims), and from its indigenousness (as the owners of the land). Women are perpetuated as inert with no social agency, homeland, or history. This discourse, in its orientalist character, blames Bedouin culture and tradition as a cause of backwardness of society and women. Thus, the woman’s body is turned into a tool to justify Israel’s enforcement. The coercive-colonialist character is covered by a modernist discourse on western liberal enlightenment and progress aimed at justifying its enforcement. For example: accusing tradition of not “integrating” with education and work.

2. In the mid-1990s, with the rise of a number of researchers, both Palestinian and non-Palestinian, in the Israeli and international academic scene, and with the growth of the
Palestinian women’s associations in the Naqab, **the discourse of marginalization and social agency was formed**. This discourse, for the first time, had Bedouin women present in the academic discourse. It also made the gender and political issues they face present, and highlighted their unspoken issues in the academic and public discourse.

This discourse examined the production of marginal identities (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2008; Allassad Alhuzail, 2016) along with their own strengths and coping strategies (I am one of them). This discourse, on the one hand, emphasized the gender marginalization of Bedouin women as a product of various political and tribal power structures in the Naqab. It also stressed women’s feminism and power sources (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2007, 2008; Marteu, 2015). This discourse moves on a connecting, and another, separating axes. Separating, because it distinguishes between the marginalization of Bedouin women, and the marginalization of Jewish and Mizrahi (Eastern) women. It positions the marginalization of women as the product of special power structures imposed on them. At the same time, it is part of a connecting axis, linking the feminist identities and the feminism of the Bedouin women with the Arab, Middle Eastern and Islamic world discourse outside the walls of Israel and the Israeli academic institution. It can be said that this discourse aims to have the silenced voices of this group of women heard, and to display the diversity of identities.

3. **The discourse of occupation, colonialization and the Nakbah** has emerged in the last five years. The indicators of this discourse began to emerge with the intensification of
political violence against the Bedouins and the Palestinians in general, the Palestinian national resistance, and contact with Palestinian researchers outside the framework of the Israeli academic discourse. This is a unifying axis that sees Bedouin women in their position, as part of the Palestinian women’s position, as part of the Palestinian people and it reconnects them with their national, religious and indigenous identities. It is a discourse that deconstructs bilateralism and the substantialist identity established by the orientalist discourse. It is an insightful and critical discourse that considers settlement colonialism a given structure and starting point. It examines the role of this structure in the design of identities from a broader perspective, for example, the historical and the legal aspects, without separating them from the context in which they are designed. Thus, for example, a few studies have recently been conducted to study the Nakbah among black and white Bedouin women (Abu-Rabia S., 2008), and study the legal history that designed the practices of the personal status law in Bedouin society (Abu-Rabia, R., 2011). These are primarily historical research; other research in this area is required to expand the scope beyond “direct” occupation-related issues, such as those that research the law or land.

This research cluster is still in its beginnings with regard to everything related to the Palestinian women in the Naqab. In order to enrich the research and be fair with it, we must produce ethical knowledge. Therefore, I suggest linking intersectionality with settler colonialism as a settlement occupation that is not temporary. I will also explain how each of the theoretical frameworks can feed and enrich
gender research in the study of the Palestinian women in the Naqab. My focus on the Naqab, stems from the fact that this is the research field in which I am active. In addition, gender research in this field, from these new angles and in general, is still new.

C. The Third Issue: The Production of Ethical Knowledge

As I mentioned above, I cannot ignore the settlement occupation, which is a central factor in the design of the society in which I live and research, under the shadow of its domination and centrality in all spheres of life, openly or covertly, as is the case in occupation regimes covered by democracy and liberal nationalism. It is imperative to define the existing situation in Israel, as a violent settlement occupation, open and covert, directed against the Palestinian community on both sides of the Green Line. The logic of the occupier is based on two main elements: the logic of elimination, and the substitution of the indigenous people, their institutions, language, space, memory, and history (Veracini, 2010). The settlement occupation apparatus does this through the processes of de-indigenization, which is to remove the indigeneity of space and language by controlling and destroying every sign of an indigenous existence. This theoretical framework enables us to comprehensively understand the extent of control over the two Palestinian communities on both sides of the Green Line, and not focus on one community (inside Israel) as if it were completely separate from the other. According to Shenhav, “the occupation project is employing devices that are not only
directed outwards, but also inwards, towards the political space, which is free of military violence, but in which a different kind of violence: administrative or police is practiced” (Shenhav, 2008, p. 267). Therefore, if I ignore this situation, I would be susceptible to doing something ethically unjust, and dealing with the Palestinian citizens of Israel as a community separate from the Palestinian people, as if a “democratic Israeli” reality had formed here. This approach ignores the occupation project and its violent measures directed at the two communities, and it subjects them to a strict police system through open and hidden devices. “The instruments of control over powers and apparatuses that use force, are not limited to the prevention, investigation and suppression of the people, but include various institutions, social practices, bureaucratic mechanisms, judicial strategies and planning systems that work together to influence the individual and society in order to produce new forms of behavior, habits, tastes and desires” (Gordon, 2008, p. 273). This means that the blurring of the Green Line in feminist research will enable the expansion of the analysis and a wider understanding of Palestinian identity, beyond the theoretical framework of equality / inequality, which would equate them with other minorities in Israel. Rouhana (2015) argues that the Palestinians’ demand for equality in all spheres of life, and their definition as a national minority within the definition of Israel as a democracy, has yielded no results. The theoretical framework of equality has posed a threat to the Jewish majority, who has used all the legal and political means to preserve the Zionist project and achieve its objectives, through the use of colonialization policies.
These policies sought to keep the Palestinians who are citizens of the State, as colonialized subjects under Jewish control and sovereignty. For this reason, Nadim Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (2014) propose framing the citizenship of Palestinians in Israel, with the term “settler colonial citizenship” as a central analytical framework for understanding the dependent position of the Palestinian citizens in Israel, as an extension of the aims of the Zionist project on both sides of the Green Line.

At the same time, women’s research in the academic institution in general, has evolved from the angle of intersectionality theory. This theory drives gender research forward, and is essential in researching Palestinian women. According to sociologist Sylvia Walby and others, (2012), the theoretical importance of researching intersecting-power relations, is its pioneering analysis. It enables the detection of special power structures that intensify the intersections that imprison women and increase their marginalization. This analysis also enables finding ways to detect multifaceted inequalities and effective ways to address them, and ultimately to legislate laws based on a policy of reducing the inequalities. The examination of the intersections of life axes does not separate between repression apparatuses. However, it claims that there are interconnected repression devices, which an encounter between them, results in a new phenomenon in the form of a new suppressive structure or category (Crenshaw, 1989; 1993). This theory though, continues to focus on examining inequality, which is important in studying the marginal intersectionality of Palestinian women. However, the theory of intersectionality does not make sense, if we do
not link it to the settlement colonialist framework, because it lacks the composite of occupation, as a supreme force that moves and nourishes the other intersections.

Therefore, I would argue that the theory of intersectionality cannot be separated from the theoretical framework of settlement colonialism. The first is of importance to the second, nurturing and enriching it, and enabling it to expand its research scope in terms of the research subject. The intersectionality theory helps us to dismantle the marginal intersectional situation of the Palestinian women and examine the different identities of their lives. However, these gender identities cannot be designed without the context of the structured apparatus of power and violence in the settlement colonialist system, which is based on devices to enforce obedience, power and sovereignty. These violent and powerful forces are employed against the Palestinian women on both sides of the Green Line and affect the design of their gender, sexual and family identities, and the production of dependent identities on both sides of the Green Line. The conceptual framework of settlement colonialism helps us to see how gender identity is shaped in Palestinian society, by promoting patriarchy (Shalhoub-Kevorkian et al., 2012; Meari, 2015; Ghanem, 2005), designing behavioral habits, and restriction of women through patriarchal alliances (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2016). The focus on this theoretical framework in feminist research on Palestinian women is still not widespread within the boundaries of the Israeli academic institution.

The added value of both theoretical frameworks is that
they feed one another. The theory of intersectionality feeds the theoretical framework of settlement colonialization, as Rita Dhamoon suggests (2015). If settlement colonialism describes a given situation of power structures, the theory of intersectionality opens these power structures and dismantles them. It also disconnects the contexts and relationships between them within each structure, helping us to analyze the settlement occupation apparatus in a dynamic, compound and multidimensional way.

According to Dhamoon (2015, p.20):

“intersectionality foregrounds the multiple interesting manifestations, mechanisms and adjoining socio-political processes of settler colonialism, including land dispossession, patriarchy, ableism, heteronormativity, capitals, and white supremacy”.

Therefore, I would argue that it is true that the theory of intersectionality, helps us to dismantle the axes of power as a result of the various identities, and enables us to see the cognitive and existential axes from which every repression is generated. However, I cannot remain in the position of only dismantling identities, without the context of settlement colonialism. Why?

I will try to answer this question, through the research path I undertook at the beginning of my recent research on Palestinian professional women in the Arab and Jewish
labor market (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2017). In the literature, I identified three types of discrimination against Muslim women in the West, known in western literature as “penalties”, ethnic, religious and gender penalties. My research revealed a tribal penalty arising from conflicts between the tribal and professional identities enhanced through tribal-institutional agreements. However, from the settlement colonialization perspective, these penalties have become for me a “sign” used by the colonalist to denote the inferiority of the other through the women’s bodies. Thus, the tribal identity of women becomes a “sign” of the otherness and inferiority of the Bedouin community, which is strengthened by the colonalist settlement apparatus (Mamdani, 1996). In this way, the ruling establishment makes agreements and alliances with the tribal and patriarchal guards in order to constrain women and entrap them in the trap of the besieged economic space. The tribal penalty can be read in two ways; the “cultural” way, that is to say that tribalism is the structural identity of the Bedouin community, so the conflict is the product of collision within the community itself. The postcolonial reading, from the settlement colonialism perspective, will lead to more extensive research that point to the role of the occupier (through the arms of the Israeli establishment) in strengthening and empowering the tribal identity.

Mamdani (1996) argues that strengthening tribalism through settlement colonialism in Africa, for example, was aimed at controlling the indigenous people through their institutions. It was necessary for the colonizer to place the indigenous people in their institutions, and to design a position by which
to control through class specifications. The separation was not justified on racial or ethnic grounds, but through ethnic pluralism. In this way, tribalism was an intermediary of the colonialist control, and marred the discourse from ethnicity to tribalism.

What is meant is that settlement colonialization enabled me to reveal the devices of constraint with a broader historical perspective, and learn from other situations in the world, about the strategies of control in settlement colonialization, and not to be merely satisfied with the “cultural” interpretation that does not bring “research justice” to the respondent community.

That is, intersectionality theory helped me to dismantle and detect multiple power structures, while highlighting another power structure that is specific to the reality in question. What is missing in this disassembly process is viewing of the link, what links all the repression apparatuses that have been revealed? What is the power structure that operates it? How is it related to the different places and identities that threaten Jewish sovereignty in the economic sphere, for example?

I lack the special framework to research indigenous Palestinian women, or those under occupation, or more accurately under settlement occupation, in order to understand the practices against Palestinian women. The intersectional analysis framework allows me to dismantle the power structures. However, without the framework of settlement colonialization, I will not be able to examine the power structures as they are part of a broader colonialist apparatus, with a history and logic fueled by more extensive devices of
occupation and exclusion.

Linking feminist intersectionality with settler colonialism, enabled me to critique the various repression structures and, in particular, reveal the colonialist strategies to control minorities through gender, ethnic, religious, and tribal indicators in women’s bodies. In the words of Patricia Hill Collins; “What kind of citizens, subjects and political identities give birth to these divisions, where the fantasy of the veiled Muslim who needs rescuing, the rhetoric of the terrorist, and the prevalent democratic discourse are a pretext for building new global hegemony? [...] The intersectional analysis provides a powerful device to challenge the game of force on the world’s platform” (Hill-Collins, 2000, pp. 83 – 84) and the same is true in the Israeli context.

Summary and Future Questions

Why do we, as researchers of the Palestinian society, primarily of Palestinian women, have to deal with the occupation as an epistemological and fundamental term in our research? This is because this term helps us to see a broader view of the reality of the occupation, its devices and spirit, both historically and genealogically on both sides of the Green Line, while at the same time, through settlement colonialist models in other countries. Only in this way, can we understand that control, policing and establishment of sovereignty, whether in the West Bank or in Israel, aims to design the social body of the subordinate, as part of designing of the reality under occupation. Once we expand the scope of considering Palestinian women as part of a larger project, we expand the glossary we use,
and view the production of ethical knowledge that produces research justice, as part of the Palestinian resistance discourse and mechanisms of resilience in all aspects of life (education, society, economy, etc.), and not just to remain steadfast in the land (i.e. research focused on displacement or the land).
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The Nakbah and Palestinian Culture: Concluding another Unfinished Episode

Antwan Shulhut

Antwan Shulhut, Researcher in Israeli affairs, Literary critic with a number of studies in the field, has translated several books from Hebrew. Writes for the Palestinian and Arab press.
The Nakbah and Palestinian Culture: Concluding another Unfinished Episode

The Zionist war on Palestinian culture

Palestinian culture inside Israel was influenced by the Nakbah of 1948; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that this culture was resurrected from beneath the rubble, where it was supposed to lie buried, in spite of the effects of the Nakbah.

As the years go by, more facts come to light that demonstrate, ever more clearly, that the Zionist movement was aware that the colonization of Palestine required its cultural cleansing alongside its ethnic cleansing, and that it worked under the inspiration of this realization at a detailed operational level. All its leadership and politicians were mobilized to that goal, as were all its institutions, a host of its authors, and most of its intellectuals. These facts are related not only to the repercussions of the Nakbah for the lived reality of those Palestinians who remained in the occupying State without a homeland, but also to what the Zionists had planned for that reality in advance.

Research has been written on this matter for more than a decade, based on recently unearthed documents held in the Israeli State Archives. Perhaps the first such piece of research was written by Israeli researcher Gish Amit (Amit, 2015), who focused on the systematic looting of Palestinians’ books and copious libraries in 1948 and thereafter, and on
the significance of the fact that some wings of the “Zionist National Library” were “furnished” with the “spoils” of these looting operations. The book was published in Arabic under the title of biṭāqa milkīya (“Ownership Card”), followed several years later (in 2009) by a book by researcher Rona Sela entitled “Made Public – Palestinian Photographs in Military Archives in Israel”, which discusses Palestinian history – visual and written – in Israel’s military archives.

In the context of the new findings in his aforementioned research, Amit notes that a substantial number of studies had been written in Israel on the deleterious consequences of the 1948 Nakbah for Palestinians prior to his own research. In his view, studies by sociologist Baruch Kimmerling, and historians Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris and others made an important contribution to the subject. They did so by choosing to look at the past with their eyes staring straight into the heart of darkness, the very darkness that the Zionist consciousness, and a band of its agents in the press, literature and the academy, strove to conceal. Thus any interested member of the Israeli public could come to know more about the Palestinian refugees, and about how Israel, deliberately and systematically, prevented them from returning to their homes. They also learned that the popular version of the events, with all its ethical and heroic associations, of what was known as the “War of Independence” (the official name for the 1948 Nakbah in the Israeli lexicon), that had been ingrained deep within the Zionist spirit, was a false and distorted account, at the very least. They even know something of the extent of the refugees’ ownership and the theft of their property, land and factories, of their confiscation
and sale, first to the Israeli army, and then to whomever could pay more. However, they remained virtually illiterate about the disaster that the war waged by the Zionist movement spelled for Palestinian culture, which had been lively and vibrant before the Nakbah.

Sela draws attention to the fact that the Palestinian cultural treasures held in the Israeli archives contain comprehensive documentation of the Palestinian presence prior to the Nakbah. She provides a wealth of information about the thriving life of Palestine, and its large geographical expanse before the Nakbah. Hence it is at once a testament to the scale of the destruction that befell the Palestinian entity, not only in material terms, and also – and perhaps primarily – at the cultural level.

Of course, this disaster is well known, both broadly and among Palestinians in particular. What is new in these research studies, is that they provide concrete evidence of the process by which the history of this culture was forcibly rewritten, by the powerful, in what can be regarded as the conclusion of another unfinished episode of the Nakbah and its aftermath.

According to Amit, two issues warrant analysis in his exploration of the significance of the looting of Palestinians’ books, as part of their cultural treasures:

The first is the fact that this process attests to a moment that tangibly embodies the way in which one culture emerges from the ashes of another culture, after destroying it in its entirety. The moment of the devastation of Palestinian culture
is the moment of the birth of a new Israeli consciousness, one that is not founded merely on the erasure of the Arabs’ presence, but also on the destruction of their culture. And, having destroyed this culture, one can build the claim that the culture did not exist prior to the Zionist colonization of Palestine.

The second is that this process of domination is indicative of the way in which a vibrant and dynamic culture that was flourishing within the intimate human milieu, was deformed and refashioned as a museum artefact. And it will not be long before the majority of looted Arabic books find their place in Israeli shrine of books, stuffed on top of shelves and within arm’s reach, yet entirely devoid of life, or even a semblance thereof.

Before the research by Amir and Sela, Israeli author Yitzhak Laor (2002) analysed the process of Judaizing Palestine after the Nakbah of 1948, particularly its geographic and archaeological applications, in his essay “We are Writing You, Homeland” (or “The Severed Tongue”), which addresses that which is unspoken in the Israeli text. He does this by discussing the various fields that he emphasizes are not limited, on the part of the collective Israeli consciousness, by anything more than chatter and empty rituals, but are limited by a great deal of conspiratorial silence. This programmed silence would later become a literature directed by Israel, Jewish National Fund forests, placards commemorating donors, and settlements for immigrants. Ancient Jewish settlements from the era of the Second Temple were also endorsed or recognized. Israeli guide books specializing in
tours and excursions are informative in this respect, since they contain an inexhaustible well-spring of the – allegedly – verified settlements from the era of the Second Temple and even the First Temple, in addition to fabricated ones. They lack any mention or even hint of any earlier Palestinian villages. The only prerequisite for a village to be mentioned in these books is the presence of an ancient synagogue in them, or, in very rare instances, a church or monastery. Road signs do not indicate the ruins or vestiges of Palestinian villages unless the area was the scene of a major battle, such as the Battle of al-Qastal. When Palestinian villages are mentioned, the attributes ascribed to them are those of “seditious villages” or “gang centers” (even though battles broke out in only an extremely small number of these villages; the majority of them were destroyed without witnessing any fighting whatsoever). The mosques disappeared almost everywhere, or became more like references to a forbidden language. And the “black holes” left behind have not been filled only with indifferent forests, but also with formal competitions on the Tanakh, knowledge of the country, the Israeli army’s “legacy of combat”, annual trips and excursions by workers’ councils that follow the path of the “fighters’ footsteps”. With great alacrity, such ideological organizations as the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, journals specializing in the “history of the Land of Israel”, and research institutes that study “the history of the Land of Israel” – in addition to a long list of ideological institutions and national rituals – have turned their attention to constructing the most important constituents of the “old”, “super-historical” and “eternal” Israeli.
According to Laor, the ire of some historians and archaeologists is occasionally aroused by the Ministry of Religious Services, for its fabrication of places and shrines that have no relation whatever, close or distant, to any Jewish holy site. However, this archaeological/scientific appeal to the Ministry of Religious Services, given that it is a political rather than a scientific agency, should fool nobody. All of these appellants, in the final account, are participants in a far larger project, that has been entrusted with the mission of producing the Israeli, as the owner of this country, in his full consciousness. In addition, they have a more difficult and dangerous task: to produce the Israeli, as the owner of this country, within the consciousness of those Palestinians who remained in his homeland and avoided expulsion, or within the consciousness of those who succeeded to return, or tried to return. The researcher stresses that, in contrast to the Americans, who preserved the original names of certain regions and places in the United States, the Zionists settlers were even afraid of Arabic names. The agents of Hebrization in this field worked like bulldozers. He concludes that this violent Judaization of Palestine would definitely not have been possible had not the educated Jewish elites, and not the Ministry of Religious Services alone, been mobilized to execute it.

The socio-cultural implications of the Nakbah

The Nakbah had many socio-cultural implications for that section of the Palestinian people which remained within Israel, as has been previously discussed by numerous
researchers, led by the late Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani (1966).

As Kanafani describes it, the Nakbah was like a bottomless chasm; for not only did it leave in its wake a radical shift in Palestinian society in numerical terms, but it also triggered a fundamental shake-up of the social structure, and had a strong impact on the meanings of the cultural scene that subsequently developed among the remaining members of this society, whose situation had changed from one extreme to the other. Over three-quarters of those who remained (who were not expelled) were inhabitants of rural areas. The vast majority of the urban population was displaced from Palestine during and shortly after the Nakbah. This reality created a powerful tremor and great confusion at the core of the remainder of Palestinian society, which had awoken to a reality that had been changed, root and branch. Before the year of the Nakbah, the Palestinian cities had not only been centers of political leadership, but also, as is the case in most societies, the main centers of intellectual and cultural leadership.

After the Nakbah, Palestinian society within the borders of the Jewish State remained largely rural. At the same time, it was subjected to a political-social-cultural blockade by the Zionist movement, which assumed leadership of the newly-established State.

These two factors (the rural nature of the remaining society,
and the comprehensive blockade that the Zionist movement imposed on it) had numerous cultural implications, the most significant of which are as follows:

1. Due to their social status, the majority of those who remained lacked the cultural capital that is generally required to produce a generation of writers and artists.

2. A wall of forced cultural estrangement has arisen between them and Arabic literature, in its multiple capitals.

3. The Israeli military regime, which this society was subjected to until 1966, attempted to impose the type of literary production that it wished to propagate.

4. The limited nature of the means of publication, and their subordination to both the oversight of the Zionist authorities and to financing by the Zionist political parties (primarily Mapai), which restricted publication to a special hybrid kind of literature.

5. The society was compelled to accept educational curricula that conformed to the Zionist vision.

It was under the weight of these implications that the beginnings of a Palestinian national movement within the 1948 territories began to stir. This movement soon became a vessel for the preservation of national identity, in two specific directions that were determined by the foregoing factors:

* **Firstly**, towards a revolt against forgetfulness and the aforementioned erasure.

* **Secondly**, towards loading the Palestinian collective memory in Israel with fields rich in historical and cultural
connotations associated with the Nakbah and its effects, and also with the national identity of the Palestinians in Israel.

**The current role of culture**

Today, seventy years after the Nakbah, culture remains an extremely important element of national consciousness, collective memory, and their connection to the question of identity.

It is no exaggeration to state that culture, in its various forms, plays a major role in the processes of diagnosis and recovery, in exclusive relation to the question of the identity of Palestinians in the 1948 territories.

This role gained impetus from the emergence of the Arab nationalist political parties, specifically from the early-1980s until today, and as these parties began to take account, in terms of diagnosis and recovery, of the following facts:

1. That the resolution of the Palestinian national question within the framework of the solution proposed internationally, by Arab States, by the Palestinians, and (to some extent) by Israel – i.e. on the basis of “two States for two peoples”, Israel and Palestine, side by side – will not lead to a solution to the problem of the identity of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

2. That the process of Israelization is not a realistic option for these Palestinians. Among several reasons, two are paramount:
(a) Israelization does not offer a solution to their problems that stem from the Palestinian issue and the national conflict with Israel;

(b) Israel is not a State for all Israelis, but for Jews only. As such, the process of Israelization seeks to push the Arabs perpetually towards the margins of Israeli society.

3. The solution to the problem of the Arabs in Israel (including the question of identity) may be possible within the framework of one of two options:

(a) the founding of a single, democratic or bi-national, State;

(b) their recognition as a national minority – a homeland minority – in a State that defines itself as a State for all its citizens.

In fact, the second option has been dealt several heavy blows since the Second Intifada in 2000, and the bloody confrontations that broke out early on between Israel and its Palestinian citizens, in what is known as the “October 2000 uprising” (during which 13 Arab youth were shot dead by the Israeli police). A parallel development was the start of the collapse of the political system based on the two-State solution, in the wake of the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000.

But one may go further than that and ask whether it is still useful to embrace the discourse of civil equality and struggle for it, at a time when Israel is insisting on defining itself as a
national State for the Jewish people in a constitutional basic law.

Perhaps herein lies the importance of focusing on national consciousness and collective memory within cultural practice. In my view, these two factors are present among Palestinians in Israel, within a system of what can be regarded as “embedded memory”. Today, it is clear that the geographical Judaization of Palestine, in spite of its violence and stringent methodology, has not been able to erase the original old place names. These names remain stored as a system that is embedded in a long-term collective memory of the Palestinians who remain in Israel. And when the situation and circumstances altered, these names were extracted from the embedded field and brought back to the fore, as a short-term memory store, and reincorporated into the consciousness of the people. Hence, culture remains hugely important in the continuing construction of the Palestinian national collective memory, as it was before, in signifying awareness of the place.

And this translates into the element of the time in which the Palestinian cultural text is invoked. Here, the subject of the Nakbah enters in full force (in other words: the past time). The battle over national identity still needs help in demonstrating the historical truth, as it relates to all aspects of this time. When I speak of culture, it is with an awareness that it includes political culture, which plays an important role in socialization, not on the basis of slogans, but on the basis of studying phenomena and performing it’s given role in raising awareness and expanding the horizons of knowledge.
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Arabic


Hebrew

70 Years Of NAKBAH

Land and Planning Policies in Israel
70 years of the Nakbah

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Land and Planning Policies in Israel
70 years of the Nakbah

Introduction

According to the Israeli Planning and Building Law, there are around 50,000 housing units for Palestinian Arab families that are “unlicensed”. This means that in the best-case scenario, they are under the threat of the imposition of exorbitant fines, while in the worst-case scenario, they are under the threat of actual demolition.

This is one of the basic facts that describes the land and housing hardships suffered by the Palestinians in Israel in their towns. It reflects the daily impingement on important rights; the right to housing, the right to decent living, the right to planning, the right to quality of life in residential neighborhoods and the right to access public areas and services, etc. This situation is the result of the development of land, housing and planning policy since the establishment of the State of Israel 70 years ago.

This chapter presents an overview and examples of the development of the planning and land policy over the course of 70 years, beginning with the Nakbah of the Palestinian people and the establishment of the State of Israel to this day. The article delineates the land and planning policies by dividing them into three main axes; the first is land ownership, mainly land confiscation and property control...
laws. The second axis is the administrative, and the areas of influence for control of the land, and planning and settlement decisions. It highlights land confiscation from Palestinian towns, the establishment of Jewish settlements, and the laws and practices of separation of space, etc. The first and second axes are the basis for the infrastructure of the third parallel axis; that of planning and planning policies.

The objective of working within these three axes, is to expropriate the collective rights in space, property and land in an integrative manner (i.e. the right to land, and the right of the indigenous groups to make decisions according to international conventions). As well as impose a reality on individual local problems within the family or town, and to sever the link and belonging to the natural resources and to the public regional and provincial space of the indigenous Palestinian population.

**First Axis – Control of Land Ownership**

One of the most important tools of control adopted by the Zionist regime to control land ownership was:

- Confiscation of private property of Palestinian-owned land. The primary objective was to place the space in the hands of the dominant ethnic group as the basis for ethnic-national and political-economic control. A wide range of confiscation laws were used to ensure the lowest proportion of private ownership by the Palestinian population. These include the central laws that were used to implement “large confiscations” of Palestinian land
(Alterman, 2000): The Fallow Lands Law of 1921, by which the land was expropriated from every owner who was at a distance of 2.5 km from the land and did not register it in the Land Registration Department, (the law was applied in parallel with the application of emergency laws to expel the Palestinians from their land and displace them). The Land Law of 1927, the Law of Confiscation of Waqf\(^1\) Land, the Law of Confiscation of Land for Public Needs in 1943 (according to which, as a first stage in 1950, about 1,200 dunams\(^2\) of Nazareth land were expropriated for the establishment of the city of Nazareth Illit and later, 5,500 dunams for the establishment of Carmiel on the lands of the Shagour villages). The Absentee Property Law of 1950; the Citizenship Act of 1952; the Law of Return of 1950; the Statutory Limitation Act of 1958; the Land Purchase Act of 1953. Under these laws, most of the Palestinian lands were confiscated in the Triangle, Galilee and the Naqab (Negev).

- Use and application of military government laws and emergency regulations to control the land. There are several examples of the use of these laws, including; the Security Areas Act – Emergency Situations of 1937 and 1945; The Fallow Lands Law, which grants the Minister of Agriculture the right to declare and confiscate land that has not been exploited for the period of one year; The 1948 Law of Control; the law of declaring Palestinian

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1. Waqf is an endowment made by a Muslim to a religious, educational, or charitable cause.
2. A dunam is a unit of land area enclosing 1000 square meters, equivalent to about 0.25 acres.
villages closed military zones and controlling them in absolute terms.

- Transfer of ownership of Palestinian land to the State, to the Development Authority and the KKL-JNF (Keren Kayemet LeIsrael – Jewish National Fund). All land was placed under the management of the Israel Land Administration. The result was State control and ownership of about 93% of the land within its borders. These lands included land intended for housing, commerce, industry and tourism, as well as land containing important natural resources, infrastructure and military zones (Ibid).

- The management and planning of land by private bodies to prevent the allocation of land to the Palestinian Arab population. The KKL-JNF is a prime example of this, as it has become the main owner of most of the agricultural and residential lands in Jewish settlements and towns. Since its founding, the KKL-JNF has served as a Zionist tool to purchase land and settle Jews, and has prevented any Arabs from buying or using its land, estimated at 2.5 million dunams. Furthermore, the KKL-JNF owns a large number of lands surrounding Palestinian towns and manages them as forests and woods (according to the National Plan 22 – see the third axis of this article).

3. The KKL-JNF was founded by a resolution of the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1901. It is a permanent national fund whose role is to buy land in Palestine and nationalize it for the benefit of the Jewish people. According to the KKL-JNF Charter, which aims to purchase land in the name of the Jewish people and for them, its principle is the eternal ownership of land and the prohibition of its sale.
Development of the Axis of Ownership Today and its Implications

Control of land ownership is one of the most important tools to ensure control of the land as a resource, as an essential tool and an integrated axis for the implementation of the Zionist project. Ownership under the Land Law of 1969 is the right to hold on to the land, to use it, and to make every transaction appropriate to the limitations available under the law or convention. Ownership is the absolute right of the owner of the land to prevent any other person from using or developing the land for any purpose, and it guarantees the largest or full package of rights (Ibid).

The confiscation of land created a new and distinct reality that violates the right of the Palestinian Arab population to receive basic needs. The most important post-confiscation phenomena and control over land ownership are:

1. Palestinian Towns and Residents Without Housing Solutions, and Without Social-Cultural Services

The large confiscation process (macro confiscations) continued until the 1970s. Palestinians lost most of their land, until they owned no more than 2.4% of the land within the borders of the State. Some of these remaining privately owned lands, were used to meet the housing needs of the Palestinian population. However, some of them cannot be built upon, as they are located in an area away from the existing development area or because of their planning status. Around 60% of the Palestinian population have no land to build on. This segment is defined
as a group of families who do not own a home, and are the core demand group for the marketing of land under “State ownership” for the purpose of building housing units. Some of the few pieces of land that are marketed for large sums, are lands that have been previously confiscated from Palestinian residents.

The new reality of land ownership imposes a socio-economic reality that is discriminatory and unjust to the residents, as well as to the status of the land within the towns, the possibilities of investing in them, their value, and the possibility of managing or planning them.

2. The Israel Lands Administration (ILA) and Discrimination in Land Management and Marketing

The ILA is the body that manages 93% of the land, and is the landowners’ arm. Although according to the general laws, the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) has to apply fair, non-discriminatory and nonselective decisions, data on land distribution and planning reveal a different discriminatory reality: Until 1994, only 0.25% of State land was allocated (Law-Yone 1995). Between 2005 and 2009, only 21% of the land needs of the Palestinian towns were allocated, and in 2007, only 7% of the total land marketed in the State were marketed in Palestinian towns (Arab Center for Alternative Planning, 2008).

Comparison of the prices of marketed residential plots shows that the sale prices in Arab towns are 2.5 times higher than in Jewish towns. In addition, there is no investment in programs
that support housing availability, assistance to young couples and other programs and projects implemented in Jewish towns (rental units; individual assistance to families and young couples; available grants and loans; popular housing).

3. The KKL-JNF and the Tightening of Control on Land Development and Projects for Jews

After the KKL-JNF seized control of about 12% of the land in the State, over the years, it developed a land management mechanism, implementation of control, ensuring Jewish settlement and Arab isolation in existing towns. What distinguishes the phase is the transition from the institutionalization phase, building of apparatuses and infrastructure, to the phase of their use for implementation and continuity.

“The KKL-JNF does not stop with forests, but invests in education, infrastructure and the periphery regions”. This is the motto of the KKL-JNF in the media program to celebrate the State of Israel’s 70th year. In the media program, a person representing David Ben-Gurion appears, inspecting the State, settlement and revival of the empty land, 70 years after the establishment of the State and the first implementation of the Zionist dream.

Protecting the Land in the Face of the Development of Arab Towns

One of the most important tools to preserve the KKL-JNF land is to plant the land and convert its legal-planning status
to forests and woods. The main tool for implementing the protection was the ratification of the national forestry plan\(^4\). These forests surround most of the Palestinian towns and prevent approval of expansion plans. In this position, we see the KKL-JNF as a body that places obstacles to the expansion of the towns, to strictly apply Zionist policy and ideology in two contradictory ways: in the Jewish towns, there is investment in development, settlement and Judaization of space, offset by investment in the protection of trees in order to prevent the development and expansion of Palestinian towns.

The Second Axis – The Administrative Axis

In parallel with the confiscation of land, an administrative – influential organizational structure was organized and designed to facilitate effective control and build Jewish settlements and towns.

Before 1948, each Palestinian town had an area of “influence” and a life called “historical village lands”, which it managed and constituted the space for its future natural development. The area of village lands expressed the distinct type of development of the town. For example, the agricultural village included vast agricultural lands within its borders, and the urban towns included an urban structure of residential neighborhoods of different character. The Nakbah of 1948 and its consequences to date imposed a new distorted reality: the confiscation and reduction of the village’s area of life; the displacement of the inhabitants of some villages to neighboring villages and the

\(^4\) National Master Plan 22 (TAMA 22). See details in the third axis of this article.
imposition of demographic changes and a different ownership reality; demolition of central villages in a regional area, etc. All this led directly to the curtailment of the natural urban and structural development and the local and regional functions of the Palestinian villages. In addition to the imposition of a distorted reality in which the towns tried to embrace their residents in the residual space and within the remaining natural resources, the most important of which was the land.

In the Israeli legal system, the term “historical village lands” was replaced with the “jurisdiction area of the town” or the “jurisdiction area of the local authority”. The jurisdiction area is the area that belongs to a particular town and is under its administration. The jurisdiction area and its size is a key factor in determining the area of the local planning and development boundaries of the town. Accordingly, it directly affects the possibilities for expansion, including ensuring housing solutions, economic and administrative development of the town, natural resources and public and cultural facilities, as well as the interrelationship between the towns and the building of a sustainable regional service continuum.

The mechanisms and the main phases in controlling the

5. In the legal definitions there is a jurisdiction area and a local planning area. It is complex and I will not be able to address it in this article. However, it is important to note that planning authorization cannot be implemented in the jurisdiction area, unless it matches the boundaries of the planning area. In the case of our Arab towns, the issue remains an additional factor in the argument for change, as it is one of the main obstacles in approving plans and obtaining building permits.
jurisdiction areas and imposing a new administrative rule:

1. Confiscation of most of the lands that were historically within the land area of the Palestinian towns, extending State authority directly on them or annexing them to the jurisdiction areas of Jewish towns and settlements, to facilitate their confiscation and control their use.

Demolition of Palestinian villages, Land Confiscation and Reduction of the Space:

The following is an estimate of the areas that were confiscated from Palestinian Arab towns according to a timetable (see figure 1):

- The land area of the historical Palestinian towns that existed before the Nakbah\(^6\) was around 19,450,000 dunams, equivalent to 95.2% of the land area of the State (after 1948).

- The land area of the historical Palestinian towns that were not destroyed, (after 1948) was around 1,580,000 dunams, equivalent to 7.7% of the land area of the State.

- The jurisdiction areas of the remaining Palestinian towns are today around 700,000 dunams, equivalent to 3.4% of the total land area of the State.

- The establishment of Jewish settlements and public facilities adjacent to the Palestinian towns on

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6. What is meant by all the historical Palestinian towns: those whose inhabitants were displaced and those whose inhabitants were not. The calculation of land area is according to the Mandate maps of 1933.
confiscated or expropriated land. Conversely, while demolishing Arab villages and displacing their inhabitants, and confiscating the lands of the remaining towns, investment was made in establishing Jewish settlements and towns.

Table (1): Phases of Settlement Building During Different Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of Jewish Settlements and Towns Established in the State of Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Until 1961</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 – 1972</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 – 1983</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 until today</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The source of the figures and charts is from an analytical research I conducted in the Arab Center for Alternative Planning in 2012. The basic information is derived from the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Israeli Interior Ministry. The analysis was conducted using GIS (Geographic Information System).
2. Constricting the Jurisdiction Area of the Palestinian Towns

The map of the jurisdiction areas was designed to suit and serve the Zionist vision, and to ensure broad Jewish control (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000; Blanc, 2005). There is a large gap in the allocation of land between Jewish and Arab local authorities and sheer discrimination against Palestinian towns.
Table 2: Distribution of Jurisdiction Areas – Comparison between Palestinian and Jewish Towns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (dunams)</th>
<th>Allocation per capita (square meter per person)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Local Authorities</td>
<td>18,501,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Local Authorities</td>
<td>713,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Local Authorities</td>
<td>204,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Jurisdiction</td>
<td>1,179,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to constricting local space, the map of the jurisdiction areas shows the process of cutting off the geographical and regional links between the Arab towns. Over the years, regional local councils were established to control the land between the Arab towns, thus limiting the expansion of the towns and ensuring the prevention of geographical connectivity between the Arab towns and preclude regional functional partnerships.

**Separation of Housing Areas of Arabs and Jews**
The project of Judaizing the land and space as a central axis in the Israeli government, has been able to design a distinct separate space between the Palestinian and Jewish populations. The existing structure is an ethnocratic society and regime, which was able to divide the space into three

8. for both palestinians and Jews.
groups: the founders, the immigrants and the Arabs (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000). The legal and planning apparatus were essentially able to “maintain” the ethnocratic division between the Jews and Palestinians, and impose “apartheid” mechanisms and ruling decisions to abort most attempts to change the circumstances of separation.

Today, 85% of the Palestinian population live in separate towns, 9% live in mixed towns, and 6% live in unrecognized villages and neighborhoods (it should be noted that the majority of the Palestinian population in the mixed towns live in separate neighborhoods).

The process of separation between the Arab and Jewish residents took place through the use of a system of Jewish agricultural and rural towns that were administratively annexed to regional councils established to control 80% of the State’s lands (Hananel, 2009). In order to live in these towns, the applicant must obtain the approval of an Admissions Committee, which, over the years, has been able to forbid access to the Arabs. In other words, the Palestinian population have been prohibited from living in 80% of the land in the State (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000). The issue was dealt with in a Supreme Court decision, which approved the prohibition of this mechanism that discriminates and impinges on the rights of the Palestinian citizens. However, the Court’s decision could not change the fait accompli and did not address the previous discrimination in allocation (Kedar, 2004). In 2011, the Israeli government ratified a law to legitimize the existence of Admissions Committees. The Supreme Court rejected Adalah’s and other human rights
organizations’ claim against the law, arguing that it is too early to make a judgement on the law at this stage.

**Jurisdiction Areas – Current Situation**

Palestinian towns are the primary living space of the Palestinian citizens, and they suffer from discrimination in the allocation of land. The current separate housing structure impinges on their right to choose the place, quality and state of their housing (rural, agricultural, urban, distance from the city, type of building, density, etc...), so these towns are currently the main choice.

In 2016, as part of implementing the recommendations of the 120-day government team, it was declared that geographical committees\(^9\) would be established to examine the expansion of jurisdiction areas. However, the changes are still nonexistent: in the current situation, the Arab towns must submit their request to expand their jurisdiction area and prove their need for land. Conversely, negotiations are held with regional councils mainly to examine their willingness to “relinquish” these lands to “support” the Arab towns. There is an uneven discourse that results, in the best-case scenario, in the addition of constricted space and the preservation of the inequitable structure of land distribution, control of resources and maintenance of the administrative system. A system determined 70 years ago by the management of Zionist

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9. The geographical committees work to investigate and examine the issue of areas of jurisdiction. Within their authority is to examine and issue recommendations to the Interior Minister. However, the authorization of an expansion or change in the jurisdiction area of the local authorities is under the absolute authority of the Interior Minister.
ideology, whose plans are still working and determining reality. Zionist ideology defined the laws, designed the space and the planning and legal mechanisms. However, these mechanisms today, realize and apply the ideology autonomously and spontaneously (Issachar, 2004).

The Third Axis: The Planning Axis

The national and regional spatial planning was based on three principles that were the foundation of land laws and planning (Alterman and Stav, 2001):

1. Geographical distribution of the Jewish towns and settlements to control national space and the natural resources;
2. Preservation of the demographic majority of Jews in all areas;
3. The dominant Jewish national space in all lands and regions.

One of the important national plans that designed and continues to design the geographical and political space on the land in the State is the Sharon Plan (1950). This plan was designed to distribute the Jewish population and settlements on the ruins of the destroyed Palestinian villages and control the land, space and natural resources. This plan was followed by several national plans that were based on the first plan, and developed housing, social and security solutions according to the immediate goals they served; absorption and distribution of immigrants; Judaization of the Naqab (Negev) and the Galilee; strengthening the borders; control of the natural
resources; and demographic balances. The plans were the implementing instrument of the political vision and ideology. This part of the article highlights the use of relatively “modern” planning and plans that directly affect the life and development of the Palestinian towns and villages. These plans were adopted and implemented following the period of large confiscations. As planning and the use of planning tools are the complementary axis to that of control of land ownership, and determining its management. After reducing the space, controlling the main resources, and confiscating property, planning was used to serve the Zionist ideology, politics and politicians in order to control the remaining land and space within the borders that were designed and drawn for the Palestinian towns.

The focus on using planning tools based on the 1965 Planning and Building Law, emerged in the early 1980s, when the period of large confiscations of the Palestinian territories came to an end. This is symbolized by Land Day in 1976, which took place as a result of the declaration of the confiscation of thousands of dunams of Palestinian land.

Here, I will detail the most important main stages and planning mechanisms for this phase:

1. Approval of National and Regional Structural Plans
   The planning system in Israel is a centralized system\(^{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) In recent years, changes have been made in the law that aim at distributing planning authority to local planning committees as part of strengthening democratic governance. These are now in the implementation stages.
that relies on the allocation of great authority to the national and regional planning committees. The existing planning institutions do not include any appropriate representation of Palestinian citizens. As part of the legal means to implement planning policies, national and regional structural plans that seek to impose restrictions and definitions of land use are approved. It is worth noting that one of the most important plans affecting the development of Palestinian towns is the National Master Plan No. 22 related to forests and woods (TAMA 22), and the National Master Plan No. 8 (TAMA 8) for National Parks. The plans are valid on all State lands, including land within the jurisdiction areas of the Palestinian towns. According to the National Plans (TAMA 22 and TAMA 8), in addition to the regional plans, 55% of the lands in Palestinian towns’ jurisdiction areas are protected lands to varying degrees. The national and regional plans were able to ratify a multiplied reduction in the development areas of the Palestinian towns.

2. Judaization Plans

Although the long period of Jewish settlement construction and large confiscations has passed, settlement and Judaization projects remain among the existing mechanisms. During the

11. Israel is divided administratively into five regions; the North, Haifa, the Center, Jerusalem, and the South. Each region has a certified structural plan.
12. The KKL-JNF is responsible for the management and protection of land declared as wooded areas and forests according to the National Plan 22.
various periods, new settlement initiatives appear in various forms; for example, “Shibolet”, a town for people with special needs on the land of Turan; and “Kesif”, a town for religious Jews in the Naqab. The most important live example of settlement and Judaization of the space is the construction of the town of Harish on the lands of the Palestinian towns in Wadi Ara, in order to control the land and prevent the demographic concentration of the Palestinians. In this short article, I will not be able to provide more details on the issue, but the plan for Harish embodies a recent and direct example of implementing the objectives of the Zionist vision using planning mechanisms and the law to this day.

3. Failure to Establish or Plan Any Modern Palestinian Town
Since the Nakbah, the number of Palestinian citizens has increased tenfold. However, the geographical space of the primary area of residence (the jurisdiction areas of the Palestinian towns) has been reduced, and no new Palestinian towns have been established (except for the concentration towns of the Palestinian citizens in the Naqab). The planning policy and its supporting axes have managed to delineate the boundaries to make local planning within the boundaries of the existing towns only.

4. The Unrecognized Villages
The primary grouping of the unrecognized villages is in the Naqab, but there are Palestinian neighborhoods throughout the country that have not yet been legally recognized, such as
the Sarkis neighborhood in Shefa-Amr and others. The case of the unrecognized villages in the Naqab is a central concern in land and planning issues. These villages have suffered from various government plans and decisions, these include; the Regional Master Plan 4, with amendments 14 and 23; the Prawer Plan; and plans for individual farms; etc. These have resulted in the repeated demolition of entire villages and the displacement of the indigenous populations from their villages and their concentration in overcrowded neighborhoods. In the past year, discrimination and unjust policy have been embodied in the approval and implementation of a plan to uproot the town of Um al-Hiran in the Naqab, to replace it with the Jewish settlement of Hiran.

5. Local Master Planning

Local planning features:

“Lack of planning”. No plans have been prepared for Palestinian towns, and the borders adopted are within the areas defined by the national and regional plans.

“Restrictive Planning”. The boundaries were drawn according to the existing building area. The demarcation of borders was not accompanied by a real study of the needs, but rather was primarily put to control and prevent the natural development and expansion of the Palestinian towns and citizens. What happened was contrary to the planning policy applied in the Jewish towns (Khamaisi, 1992).

In the late 1990s, especially in the early 2000s, an initiative was started by the Planning Department to prepare for
local master plans. The initiative can be linked to the events of October 2000 and the Or Commission report, which referred to the housing shortage, lack of planning in the Arab towns and inaccessibility to building permits as a cause of the events.

During the years following 2000, dozens of local plans were prepared and deliberated. A survey of 119 Arab towns, conducted in 2012, found that 75 towns had prepared a master plan. Of these, 41 had had their plan approved, 19 had their plan filed, and 15 had plans in the planning phase (the Arab Center for Alternative Planning and Bimkom, 2012).

Despite the initiative to prepare and approve the plans, we can see from examining the content of these plans that they did not provide the expected solutions. 65% of the approved plans have not been able to obtain building permits or market housing units, and there is a need to prepare other detailed plans. It should be noted that the preparation of local master plans has involved several additional problems: failure to meet the real needs of the towns; lack of economic vision; adopting the jurisdiction areas as existing boundaries for the plans,\(^\text{13}\) not involving the residents, control of planning

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\(^{13}\) Lately, as part of the new comprehensive master plans being prepared by the Planning Department following the recent changes to the Planning and Building Law 2016, plans are being prepared that include, in specific cases, adjacent development zones outside the declared jurisdiction area boundaries. In such cases, the local authority submits a request to expand the jurisdiction area based on the master plan.
decisions by the planning institutions and ministries’ representatives.

6. Detailed Planning

The detailed planning of the residential neighborhoods is the main legal planning tool for determining the use of land for residential areas and obtaining building permits, utilities and services, open areas, etc. Over the decades, no plans have been made. In a new geopolitical context, and as part of implementing the recommendations of the 120-day government team, the Government Decision No. 922, which includes a five-year budget allocation plan, was approved for detailed planning. The implementation of the resolution began in 2017, and it is difficult at the current stage to evaluate the project. However, it places the Palestinian citizens in a new geopolitical context and new challenges that need to be dealt with within the scope of a general collective project that preserves the city and the space. At this stage, there are many issues and concerns on key topics: the policy of planning within the boundaries to impose additional changes in the population’s relationship to the public space outside the boundaries of the towns; the concentration of demographic groupings and the increase of population density within them; and their impact on the current character and development of the city and village; closing the gap of “no planning” and dealing with the discriminatory policies; decision making and the control of the funding ministries on the plans and planning decisions; conditions for obtaining budgets;
the status of local Arab authorities and local government within the framework of the resolution; specific features and the historical, political, cultural and social context of the Palestinian citizens. There are also other topics, the most important of which is how to deal with the decision within the continuous public policies and the geopolitical situation that has continued since the Nakbah to this day.
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Back to the lost land:
The ongoing struggle for recognizing the rights of the Arab Bedouin in Bi’r al Saba’ and Naqab region

Mansour Nasasra

Dr. Mansour Nasasra, Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Government at Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Was also lecturer at the University of Exeter.
Back to the lost land: 
The ongoing struggle for recognizing the rights of the Arab Bedouin in Bi’r al Saba’ and Naqab region

The Indigenous Arab Bedouin have lived in southern Palestine for centuries, mainly around the historic city of Beersheba, known as Bir al-Saba’ in Arabic. The community preserved its traditional Islamic and Palestinian culture under Ottoman and British rule, and has continued to do so under the sedentarization polices of the Israeli State. Following the creation of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Nakbah (the mass Palestinian exodus that took place that same year), 13,000 Palestinian Bedouin in the Naqab were confined in a closed zone (called sayeg in Hebrew or siyaj in Arabic), separated from both Jewish and other Arab communities (Falah, 1989). In the south, the Bedouins faced different challenges: Many were evicted from their lands and forced to live as internally displaced peoples in an enclosed zone northeast of the city of Beersheba. Today, more than 270,000 Bedouin live in the Naqab region. Approximately half live in government-planned towns, and the other half reside in “unrecognized” villages. The Indigenous Arab Bedouin make up 31 percent of the entire population of the Naqab, and approximately 12 percent of the total Palestinian minority in Israel (Nasasra, 2017). Their situation is bleak, as those
who have relocated to towns suffer mass unemployment and the effects of poor urban planning, and those who live in villages against Israeli government wishes, are cut off from state services, and constantly threatened with the destruction of crops and livestock.

Since the late 1960s, almost half the Bedouin population has been forcibly moved into planned townships under the premise of “modernizing” the community, though this also has had the effect of creating “a landless population” that is easier to control, assimilate, and perhaps relocate. Once the government-planned towns were completed, all Bedouin who refused to relocate (36 villages) were classified as “illegal and unrecognized” despite being full Israeli citizens. The Arab Bedouin who have resisted the townships continue to live in “unrecognized” villages, a term coined in the late 1980s when the community was under pressure from planning policies directed at the Naqab.

The ongoing Nakbah and the loss of land under the military rule

For the southern Palestine Bedouin communities, the fall of Bi’r al-Saba’ in October 21, marks the Nakbah in the south. In the eyes of the Arabs of the Naqab, the fall of Beersheba was a ‘black day’ in their history, and they referred to the occupation of Beersheba in 1948 as “kasret al-Sabā”, meaning in Bedouin common dialect the ‘Nakbah of Bi’r al Saba’.

After Operation Yoav had successfully conquered Beersheba,
Fallujah remained as the Egyptian army’s most stubbornly-resistant base. Following the conquest of Iraq Suwaidan, the Egyptians were then besieged in Fallujah, eventually withdrawing from Sdud and Majdal to Gaza. However, with the start of the armistice talks the Egyptian army did submit, and duly marched out of Fallujah on 26 February 1949. The IDF’s success in besieging the Egyptian army in Fallujah and Iraq al-Manshiyya, and isolating them in Majdal, represented the turning point in the war over the Naqab and sealed its destiny as part of the future of the Jewish State.

Because they lived just a few miles from Fallujah, the Jabarat Bedouin tribes, who populated the area of Tal Abu Jaber, witnessed the clashes between the Egyptian and Jewish armies at close quarters, and were the first Bedouin tribes to pay the price of the war, since most of them fled their village when the war reached them. According to one of the survivors of the war, a Bedouin sheikh of the Jabarat who today lives in the Biqa’ camp in Jordan,

*It was Ramadan and most of my tribe was trapped due to the clashes between the Jewish and the Egyptian armies. As a result some of the houses were bombed and members of various families were killed. On the 9th day of Ramadan, just after the war had calmed down, we headed East to Dawaiyma, then to Beit Jibrin and Qubaiba, then to Jericho where, together with hundreds of my tribe, we settled down and tried to build our lives in the middle of nowhere (Interview with Sheikh Wasil Abu Jaber, Biqa’ Camp, Jordan, April 2016).*
The takeover of the whole Naqab was finalized when the Israeli forces moved south and occupied Umm Rashrash, after the armistice agreement with Egypt had been signed on 10 March 1949 (PRO, FO 371/128154).

Immediately after the war, on 18 November 1948, 16 Bedouin of the remnant sheikhs sent a formal request to the new authorities to be left on their land both in the western Naqab and the historical villages. As a result, a committee was set up by the Defence Minister and a discussion ensued on 30 November about the future of those Bedouin remaining within the borders of the new Jewish State. The committee, which included Yousef Weitz (KKL official), General Yigal Yadin, and General Yigal Alon, reached various decisions regarding the Bedouin and agreed that only “friendly” Bedouin tribes would be left:

*The friendly/loyal Bedouin will be concentrated, by tribe, in three centers, at least ten km [six miles] from one another... two tribes to inhabit no man’s land east of Rohama and Shoval, close to the Dweiyma border line, and a third tribe to stay north of the Nivatim-Kurnub line...Most young men of military age will be enlisted in an appropriate combat unit [the minorities unit of the IDF] ...Michael Ha-Negbi [military governor of the Negev] will be responsible for Bedouin affairs ...the tribes will be required to commit themselves to a particular policy, as well as to obligations regarding their land. (CZA: A 246/36).*
After the war, in the Naqab, around 13,000 of the 95,000 Bedouin that had lived there before the Nakbah remained on their land; thus, like their fellow Palestinians they faced very harsh consequences as a result of the war, including expulsions activities.

Sasson Bar Zvi, the military governor of the Naqab in the 1960s, indicates that Beersheba was empty of Bedouin after the war; almost all of them had gone and not a single one remained in the city:

> In the war, people were exiled or else left to many other places. By the end of the war the main Arab city of Beersheba was empty of Bedouin. No Bedouin, no Gazan businessmen, no shopkeepers, and not even any birds remained in the city. After the war had ended some new Jewish immigrants started to come to the city (Interview with Sasson Bar Zvi, July 2007).

However, despite the end of the war, as reported by both Arab and British archival records, the Bedouin faced expulsion activities until 1959. A report from 24 November 1949, addressed to the British Foreign Office, indicates that some Bedouin (especially the ‘Azazma) had not declared loyalty to the new State, and that 700 members of the ‘Azazma tribes had been expelled:

> Israel’s version is that these Bedouin numbering 700 persons belonged to the ‘Azazma tribe who formerly lived in Al ‘Auja al-Hafir. They joined in
with the Egyptians during the fighting and when a year ago the Bedouin tribes were gathered at Beersheba to swear loyalty to Israel, the 'Azazmas were absent; they were then on the other side of Israeli/Egyptian lines. They began to filter back into Israel later. They were reportedly given a choice of where they wanted to go, and are said to have turned north-eastward into the Hebron area (PRO, FO 371/75355)

As reported by General Burns, letters from the United Nations indicated that between 7,000 and 8,000 Bedouin from the 'Azazma sub-tribe were pushed by Israel, across the international border into Egyptian territory. According to Security Council Resolution of 17 November 1950, as reported by the Truce Supervision Organization, the following sub-tribes faced expulsions: “A number of Bedouins, estimated between 6000 to 7000 appertaining to the following sub-tribes of the 'Azazma tribe have been expelled from the area under Israeli control and from the demilitarized zone across the international border into Egyptian territory; Subheyeen; Mohamadeen; Isbaihat; Sawakhneh; Imrea’at, El Assayat” (IDFA 1338/1979-714).

Many of the sub-tribes of the 'Azazma qabila on the list faced real problems concerning where to settle. A telegram addressed to the Foreign Office marked “Expulsion of Arabs from Israel” gives a clear picture of the dynamics of these events.

The facts appear to be that a section of the 'Azazma tribe which had remained on its lands at the time
of the Israeli occupation of Beersheba moved into Arab territory recently with nothing but the clothes which they were wearing. They claimed to have been beaten up and robbed of all their possessions by Israeli troops and to have been told to make for Arab territory before worse befell them. They stated that they had no idea why the Israelis treated them in this manner. The net result was that Jordan has acquired another group of utterly destitute refugees (PRO, FO 371/75355).

A meeting of Bedouin from Palestine, Israel and Jordan to discuss their situation as a result of the war, was proposed in another telegram concerning Israel’s rejection of Bedouins from the Beersheba area, sent from Jerusalem to the Foreign Office on 2 December 1949:

*Arab press yesterday reported that as a result of a meeting between Israeli and Jordanian military representatives in the south, agreement had been reached to form a committee of four Bedouin sheikhs from southern Palestine to discuss the Bedouin problem as a whole, If this is the case the matter will no doubt be adjusted in due course [through] the medium of the Mixed Armistice Commission to which Jordanian complaints have been represented (PRO, FO 371/75355).*

Commenting on IDF activities against the Bedouin in the Naqab in the 1950s, Benny Morris claims that the IDF had driven them off during the 1950s, especially the ‘Azazma
tribes, due to what he called their “Anti Yishuv”. The ʿAzazma Bedouin were the IDF’s main target, especially in the Naqab border regions. Morris estimates that during from 1949 to 1953, 17,000 Bedouin were expelled or fled from the Naqab (Morris 1993, 153-157).

The ill-treatment of the ʿAzazma during the early 1950s was also discussed by UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency) which, as an international organization working for Palestinian refugees, examined the expulsion of the ʿAzazma, and tried to find ways to donate money to alleviate their situation:

*At yesterday’s meeting of the advisory Commission to UNRWA the ʿAzazma Bedouin case was discussed. This was raised by Colonel Gohar of Egypt. He repeated the old arguments and then informed us that UNTSO special committee, meeting on August 4, 1954, has decided in favor of Egypt. This means that it was finally established that these unfortunates were driven from Israel by armed force. After some discussion it was agreed that UNRWA would (without commitment) consider the possibility of making a grant in kind to the ʿAzazma to relieve immediate distress (Extracts from letter No. 222/3/6, 2 February 1955, to Mr Simpson from the British Middle East Office, Beirut: PRO, FO 371/115627)*.

Another instance of Bedouin fleeing their land was reported in a telegram from Jerusalem to the Foreign Office on 24
November 1949; “On November 7th the Arab press reported the expulsion of 500 Bedouin families in circumstances described by the Jordan Foreign Minister” (PRO, FO 371/75355).

During the 1950s, under a strict military rule (Lazar, 2002), Bedouin lost most of their land. The military rule authorities also used the 1949 British Emergency Defense Regulations—specifically Article 126 concerning security zones and closed zones—to expropriate Bedouin land. According to Article 126, such regions were closed to Arabs, with some of these closed zones secured for Jewish settlement. Another law used by Israel to control Arab land was the Absentees Property Law of 1950. Israel controlled most Bedouin lands with this law. For the Bedouin in particular, from the creation of Israel until 1964, only 220,000 dunams remained under Bedouin control. Such legal maneuvers facilitated the expropriation of Bedouin land and concentrated the Bedouin in a shrinking space within the enclosed zone (Nasasra, 2017).

For example, Israeli archive reports dating to 1952 offer a snapshot of the early dynamics between the State and the Bedouin, regarding land. As early records indicate, the Israeli authorities were initially very careful in dealing with Bedouin land claims. A now declassified secret report shows how Israel tried to deal with matters related to Bedouin land ownership immediately after the war. In this report, sent from Rehovot to the office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defense on April 12, 1953, Michael Ha-Negbi (military governor of the Negev) wrote that, “During 1950/1951, a total amount of 19,000 Israeli Lira was collected from the
Bedouin as land tax by the Negev military governor with the help of Bedouin sheikhs. Bedouin paid money for each dunam to be recognized” (ISA GL 13904/14). Almost all the Bedouin who remained in Israel in the 1950s paid land taxes which were collected by the military governor and Bedouin sheikhs.

The government set up a small but important committee, the Weitz Committee, to deal with persistent Bedouin land ownership claims. This committee reported to the Ministry of Justice on its discussions around this contentious issue in 1952 (Nasasra, 2017). The committee proposed that it would be possible to “avoid recognizing Arab Bedouin rights on their land even if they prove that they have cultivated it for a long and extended time”, and recommended, among other things, delaying “the opening of a registration office in Bi’r al-Saba’” to prevent any Bedouin from attempting to formalize their title. The committee called on the government to speed up the passage of a land purchase law “in order to facilitate the process of transferring the land which in the past was cultivated by Bedouin to Israel development authorities.” In the same vein, the committee declared that the Bedouin “should be compensated if they can prove land ownership” (ISA GL 5742/10).

From this we learn that the committee accepted that the Bedouin had populated the Naqab before the founding of the State, recognized land cultivation as constituting evidence of ownership, and recommended compensation to Bedouin whose land was to be expropriated. If one examines the Weitz Committee’s recommendations one can argue that
Israeli policies of dealing with Bedouin land ownership were disingenuous. One the one hand, they recognized that Bedouin had populated the Naqab before 1948, and on the other they continued to use the Ottoman and the British land codes as the only legal justifications for denying Bedouin land claims and rights.

The going struggle for recognition: marching against the Prawer Plans

Since the Weitz committee in 1952 and until today, the government appointed different committees to deal with Bedouin land claims, but with little progress. The newly Goldberg and Prawer committees as the most recent examples that did not lead neither to resolve Arab Bedouin land claims or recognizing their historical villages.

In 2007, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert established the Goldberg Commission to resolve the status of Bedouin land claims in the Naqab, and address the issue of unrecognized villages. In thousands of claims dating back to the 1970s, the Bedouin sought to have 200,000 acres—a small portion of their historical lands—recognized and recorded in the state registry. In response, a proposal released by the commission (named after former Israeli high court judge Eliezer Goldberg) offered to acknowledge around 50,000 acres of Bedouin territory, as well as a number of unrecognized villages. In January 2009 the government formed a team, headed by Ehud Prawer, chief of policy planning in the Prime Minister’s Office, to implement these
recommendations. The Prawer panel offered to meet less than a quarter of Bedouin claims. The Bedouins, represented by the Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages and various local organizations, refused, seeing clearly that acceptance would lead to further loss of land and demolition of their villages. In 2011, Yisrael Beiteinu, a right-wing political party led by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, urged the government to withdraw the plan altogether. Several members of the Knesset and local Israeli council leaders in the Naqab came out in support of this idea, and the pressure from the far right paid off. The Commission modified its report, offering less land to Bedouin communities and some compensation if residents agreed to leave. Around that time, Bedouins formed the Bedouin High Committee to stop the Prawer plan from going any further. The Committee included representatives from the community, political parties, local civil-society institutions, women’s organizations, activists, the Islamic Movement, Bedouin lawyers, and members of the Knesset. Other Arab political and legal bodies also participated—and were accused of radicalizing the struggle. One of the most powerful forces against the Prawer plan was Al-Hirak al-Shababi, the youth movement in the Naqab. Its founding members were a group of highly educated students and activists from the Naqab and Arab towns in Israel who met at university and through demonstrations. They were united by their dissatisfaction with the response of older Bedouin leaders to the Prawer plan. Realizing that many young Bedouin shared this frustration, Al-Hirak al-Shababi mobilized the skills of the technologically literate generation.
Thanks to their collective efforts, the plan received extensive media coverage throughout 2013. In an unprecedented show of solidarity, Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and the diaspora rallied alongside those marching for Naqab Bedouins. As Naqabi Knesset member (MK) Talab Abu ‘Arar explained, the massive demonstrations against the Prawer plan were prompted by the Bedouins’ awareness of their rights, and the fact that the bill’s aim was to confiscate “what remained of Bedouin land, which [was] done under the cover of Israeli law”. (Interview with MK Talab Abu Arar, Jerusalem, 2015).

Public action against the plan first gained momentum in the summer of 2013 as national protests were organized under the slogan “Prawer Won’t Pass”. On July 15, a committee representing the Palestinian citizens of Israel declared a public strike to coincide with demonstrations being held in Gaza City, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Bethlehem, and the Galilee. The largest protest took place in Beersheba, where activists staged a peaceful sit-in to block a main street near Ben Gurion University. Two weeks later, there were further demonstrations in Beersheba, Wadi ‘Ara, the Triangle area of central Israel, the West Bank, and cities around the world. On the last day of August, around 1,000 people took to the streets in the center of Tel Aviv.

Protests reached a high point on Nov. 30, 2013, the eve of the Knesset’s second vote on the Prawer plan. Activists organized a “Day of Rage” in Israel, the Occupied Territories, and dozens of other locations worldwide. Thousands of protesters turned out in the Naqab, Jerusalem, and Haifa,
and the Naqab Bedouin village of Hura became the epicenter of the demonstrations. The youth group Al-Hirak al-Shababi coordinated the day’s events, inviting 19,000 people on Facebook and arranging transportation for protestors. Organizers shared promotional posters and spread the hashtag #StopPrawerPlan on Twitter. Solidarity protests were held in places such as Jerusalem, Gaza, London, Berlin, Rome, Istanbul, Cairo, and various American cities. The “Day of Rage” marked the first time that young, well-organized Arab groups led demonstrations against the Prawer plan, echoing the political mobilization that had taken place in the surrounding region during the Arab Spring (Nasasra, 2017).

On March 26, 2015, the Joint List, a coalition party made up of smaller Arab political parties, led a four-day “March for Recognition” for Palestinian and Bedouin rights. The creation of the Joint List two months earlier had been a watershed moment: Multiple groups had united in an attempt to ensure Arab political representation in Israel, and the party quickly became the country’s third largest. According to organizers, the aim of the march was to raise awareness of the terrible living conditions in unrecognized Bedouin villages, and to request their formal recognition. After the creation of the Joint List, a number of MKs from the party visited the Naqab, calling the Bedouin cause one of their top political priorities. As MK Yousef Jabareen stated, “the Naqab context and the struggle against Prawer unify us. The urgent need to deal with the situation in the Naqab is more important than our internal disagreement on various issues” (Interview with MK Yousef Jabareen, Hura, 2016). While
efforts to relocate around 40,000 of the Bedouin community have not ceased (in the case of al Araqib and Umm al Hiran), the population has mobilized and is poised to continue its resistance until today.
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The Development of Social Services for the Palestinian Minority under Israeli State Policies 1948 – 2017

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Introduction

Social services for the Palestinians in Israel, from the Nakbah until this period, have been characterized by blatant disregard by the relevant state institutions, primarily the Labor, Welfare and Social Services Ministries known by various names. The policy in the field of social services has been characterized by declared and implicit discrimination towards the indigenous minority at three central levels. First, equality, i.e. the lack or scarcity of resources and budgets for this population. Second, recognition, i.e. not to recognize the Arab-Palestinian narrative, in its component parts, in most of the instructions, services, programs or methods of professional intervention. Third, partnership, which is embodied in the exclusion of Arabs altogether or merely allowing a representative minority (ostensibly) to participate in decision-making and social policy-making (Agbaria, 2017).

The policies of the relevant Israeli authorities towards repeated demands and even the Palestinians’ insistence on

full equality, full recognition and genuine partnership in social services can be summarized in four strategies that have been used in successive periods (Mahajne, 2018; Jabareen and Agbaria, 2010).

The First Strategy: “Non-recognition” (1948 – 1952)

The strategy of “non-recognition” aims at ignoring Arab claims, postponing, delaying or belittling them. This strategy was manifested towards the Palestinian minority, who acquired Israeli citizenship, from the declaration of the establishment of the State in 1948 until the end of 1952. At that time, the State of Israel decided to relieve international institutions, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other UN agencies such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of its social responsibilities to provide basic aid to the Palestinians inside the Green Line, which was ratified during the Rhodes Armistice Agreement in mid-1949. In other words, the Israeli authorities did not recognize their responsibilities towards their Palestinian citizens after the Nakbah, in which they had lost all their material and symbolic possessions, and completely ignored their life requirements by instructing international institutions to meet their needs until, for purely political reasons, they decided to withdraw this authorization (Mahajne, 2018).

The strategy of “cheap recognition” removes the legitimacy of the demands of the Palestinian minority, by turning them into an importunity or nuisance that is possible to live with and adapt to. This strategy was manifested towards the Palestinian minority in Israel during the period from when the State decided to reclaim its social responsibility for the Palestinian citizens from the international institutions until the tripartite aggression and the Kafr Kassem massacre in October 1956. At the time, the Israeli establishment declared the end of the period of expulsion of Palestinians from the country, and the need to formulate new policies consistent with the fact that they remained as citizens of the State. The Zionist decision-makers’ idea at the time was that the remainder of the Arabs in the country would be expelled or evacuated when faced with the first “collective disaster” (see Field Testimonies Archives: Bäuml, 2006). Accordingly, the government, during the military rule, ignored all the social needs of the Arabs, with the exception of some social services that served the State’s agenda and interests. For this purpose, the ‘Department of Social Services for Minorities” was established in the Relief Ministry. The department was overseen by a single employee whose job was to coordinate with the military government, and all the departments within the ministries that dealt exclusively with the minorities (i.e. the Palestinians). During this period, 18 social workers and a juvenile and adult conduct officer were appointed, most of whom had not received any professional training to practice social work. The “Department of Social Services for Minorities”, through Arab social workers, focused on
employing internally displaced Palestinian refugees within the framework of a “Forced Labor” project in order to settle them in the new towns they had fled to. During the period of “cheap recognition”, juvenile and adult conduct officers were activated to monitor and control the Arabs who violated civil law, and particularly security, such as herding livestock on land seized as “absentee property” and considered as “State land”. The State authorities, represented by the Relief Ministry, delegitimized the social needs of the Arab minority, by turning them into a source of nuisance that can be lived with and adapted to, unless the matter directly served their interests (Mahajne, 2018).

The “policy of disrespect” acknowledged the existence of problems and needs. However, it did not recognize the necessary solutions, or it transferred the required resources in slow and gradual additions, using partial and sporadic measures to keep the unwanted situation as it is.

In 1957, this policy, with its various manifestations, persisted as the Israeli leaders became convinced of the Palestinians’ steadfastness on their land and their intention not to run, (at the same time, the Israeli authorities were unable to uproot them and expel them outside their homeland), until Minister Yitzhak Herzog took over the “Welfare and Social Affairs Ministry” (in 2006), and adopted the policy of “bridging the gaps” between the Arabs and Jews.

The different manifestations of the “policy of disrespect” can
be differentiated into three successive periods: deepening of the discrimination (1957 – 1968); managing the gaps (1969 – 1992); and reducing the gaps (1993 – 2007). Perhaps the common characteristic in these three periods is Israel’s adoption of the establishment of a declared and hidden “bilateral welfare State”, (Rosenhek & Shalev, 2000). By adopting an exclusionary social system that does not depend on citizenship or the criterion of “need” (the citizen must prove his or her need for the benefit / service by passing an entitlement examination), or “insurance” (prepayment of social insurance premiums for a specific period of time to receive the benefit). Rather it is based on the criterion of “belonging” to a particular segment (mostly Jews), or considerations of a class, client or loyalty to power.

In order to entrench the system of “bilateral social services”, the State played two controversial roles: the “strong State”, and the “weak State” or “the established State” and the “derelict State”. On one hand, the State took full responsibility, exemplified in determining the instructions, regulations, supply, funding and control of the social services provided to its Arab citizens. On the other hand, the discourse of “multiculturalism” was exploited to legitimize the qualitative and quantitative differences in social services between its Jewish and Palestinian citizens. This was done by State institutions selecting professional literature dedicated to the “alienation” of Arab culture and its components, and portraying it as backward and in need of “special attention” (Rabinowitz, 1998, pp. 148 – 137). In other words, the State trumped the “discourse of recognition” over the “equality discourse” (Ram and Berkovitch, 2006) and established
separate bilateral social services for Arabs and Jews. At a later stage, in the late 1980s, the Labor and Welfare Ministry portrayed itself as weak as a result of the decentralization and privatization practices that had pervaded it, and included the entire public facilities within the country.

The Manifestations of Policies of Disrespect

The following are the manifestations of the “policy of disrespect” in three successive periods: deepening of the discrimination (1957 – 1968); managing the gaps (1969 – 1992); and reducing the gaps (1993 – 2007).

Deepening of the Discrimination (1957 – 1968)

The strategy of deepening the discrimination extended from the end of the period of “waiting for the evacuation of the Arabs from the country” until the end of the military rule\(^2\). The “Department of Social Services for Minorities” was officially abolished, while the role of “coordinator for minority affairs” was maintained between the Relief Ministry and other bodies concerned with Palestinian citizens, primarily, the military government.

In this period, the discrimination between Palestinian and Jewish citizens deepened. Only 33 Arab social workers were appointed, including conduct officers, most of whom had not received any professional training to practice social work. A

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2. Bäuml (2007) found that the abolition of military rule was in 1966, but the termination of its practice was in 1968.
few received initial training within the Arab Social Workers Training Institute, which focused on the actual staff in the Relief Ministry that they wanted to be professionally trained.

Arab social workers continued to focus on services of an orientalist colonialist nature that were in the interest of the State, such as the continuation of the so-called re-education of the Arab population, raising awareness (taking care of hygiene and ways of using new electrical appliances), prevention (urging vaccinations for children, and being careful around the house to prevent injuries). Conversely, juvenile and adult conduct officers continued to follow those who violate civil and security law, monitor and control them, they were called “infiltrators” by Israel, they were Palestinians who had decided to return to their hometowns from their place of refuge or who had participated in any resistance movements against the military rule with the aim to return. In accordance with the instructions of the “Relief Ministry”, the Arab social workers were prevented from reaching out to those segments who most urgently needed material and moral assistance: the unemployed, the elderly, the widows, the orphans, those with special needs (blind, deaf, mute and disabled); chronic patients and others.

Following the protest events of the Eastern Jews in the Valley of the Cross in Haifa (1959), the Relief Ministry began pumping budgets into the Eastern Jewish community and acknowledging that the Ministry’s interest in the coming decades, was to “bridge the gap between the Westerners and Easterners within the one Jewish home”. However, the leaders of the Relief Ministry acknowledged that the
Arabs had not yet taken their final position regarding their citizenship and belonging to the State of Israel. This step further deepened the gap in social services between the Arabs and Jews (Mahajne, 2018).


This period extended from the abolition of the military government, until Ora Namir took over the Labor and Welfare Ministry in the Second Rabin Government. The policy of this Ministry was based on “managing the gaps”, i.e., acknowledging the presence of gaps in the provision of social services between the Jewish and Arab groups, and trying to manage them, by claiming that there is no possibility to bridge the differences in a limited period of time. However, they did not deal with the Palestinians as a national group, but as regional and geographical sects and identities.

The number of Arab social workers was 102. Most of them worked in the social welfare offices. Sixteen social workers served as conduct officers. Four specialists worked in the rehabilitation department of the National Insurance Institute, and three specialists worked in hospitals. A single specialist worked in the Labor and Welfare Ministry in the area of girls in distress.

Eight independent social welfare offices were initiated in the Palestinian towns, as well as six regional offices that served the other Palestinian towns, based on the sectarian-regional distribution (Druze, Bedouins of the North, Bedouins of the Naqab, Muslims, Christians, residents of mixed cities).
The Ministry had direct responsibility for the recruitment, funding, operation and monitoring of the regional social welfare offices. As a result, many social services were not provided, except for the monthly allowances to individuals and families with severe hardship and extreme poverty (until the end of 1981). This later became the “social security” provision within the “Social Insurance Institute”.

As mentioned above, social services suffered from a significant shortage of professional staff, scarcity of treatment programs and semi-absence of shelters. There were only two institutions for the mentally disabled, two for the elderly, three for juveniles who had committed misdemeanors or crimes, and ten institutions of limited absorption for children in distress and danger, known as “Orphanages”. Most belonged to churches and had been founded before the establishment of the State of Israel, or to institutions working under the auspices of charitable associations, or owned by Arab investors who tried to harvest the fruits of privatization.

Furthermore, Arab students suffered from not being accepted into the social work specialization in universities due to restrictions on the age of admission, the matriculation “Bagrut” exam grades, and the psychometric examination results. Therefore, there was a significant shortage of qualified professionals. Arab specialists were also “prisoners” of western intervention models adopted by the Israeli Labor and Welfare Ministry. This was because they had not been exposed to alternative professional theses on programs of action and therapeutic intervention models, appropriate to
the cultural specificity of the Palestinians, and judgmental of the Israeli intervention programs.

This period extended from when Ora Namir took over the Labor and Welfare Ministry in the second Rabin government (at the beginning of 1993), until Yitzhak Herzog took over the Ministry (2007). This period was marked by Minister Ora Namir’s attempts to reduce the gaps in social services through the use of uniform standards in the Ministry’s allocation of resources. The Minister’s objective was to oblige all the Ministers who succeeded her, to follow the same standard methodology in the distribution of budgets, believing that the “standard criteria”, in contrast to the policy of “corrective discrimination”, would reduce the gaps for the benefit of the Palestinian public. Adopting policies to bridge the gaps, without distributional and historical justice, would not achieve social justice and recognition policies for the Palestinians inside Israel.

Ministry officials used uniform, but unjust standards for the Arab community. They gave the greatest weight to political and cultural standards at the expense of socio-economic standards. The Ministry used six criteria in the distribution of ongoing budgets to the social welfare offices in varying proportions. The first criterion, allocated 30%, was the “number of registered users” in the social welfare office. The Arab authorities, who suffered a shortage of staff, were unable to look for new beneficiaries as the offices in the Jewish areas could. Instead, the Arab social welfare offices,
due to lack of resources, devised mechanisms to limit the number of users seeking their services, such as registering new cases on “waiting lists.” This criterion did not add additional budgets to the Arab social welfare offices, despite the real urgent needs of the Palestinian towns. In contrast, the “socio-economic ranking” of the population, which represents a real criterion of the population’s needs was only allocated 10%, while bearing in mind that the Arab authorities were at the bottom of this scale (1 – 3 on a scale of 10). The biggest disaster was the third criterion, which was also allocated 10%, was “the number of families with many children”, knowing that it is a highly credible indicator of need. Even though more than half of the families of the Arab community are large, and it was possible to benefit from this criterion in the same way as the socio-economic ranking. In other words, the political and cultural criteria, based on “expected needs”, were favored and even given precedence, over the objective and scientific socio-economic criteria that confirm the existence of “real and realistic needs” in the Arab community.

Another issue that prevented the reduction of the gaps satisfactorily was the method of quotas, under which the Welfare Ministry paid 75% of the budget, in return for obliging the local authority to pay the remainder (25%). In light of the dire financial situation suffered by the local Arab authorities, this caused a constraint, a stumbling block, which prevented the social welfare offices from receiving ongoing and developmental budgets, because of the inability of the local authority to pay its share or sometimes to just commit to it.
Finally, in relation to the Welfare Ministry’s unjust criteria for the Arab social welfare offices, the limit of the annual increase was set to 130% of the previous budget. This meant that even if the Welfare Ministry decided to correct its policies, and start transferring budgets to the Arab community, this period did not witness any radical changes, because of this predetermination.

This period witnessed a remarkable development in the social services provided to the Arab community on several levels: all the unjust regional social welfare offices were closed, and independent social welfare offices were established for most of the Palestinian towns. There was a significant and qualitative increase in the number of social workers, who began to provide services to community segments not previously covered (as they included more specializations). The Ministry transferred more generous ongoing and developmental budgets; approved a greater number of more diverse treatment programs; community-day centers were established; shelters were authorized through privatization, drawing on Arab entrepreneurs (associations or businessmen) to provide services, while maintaining the Ministry’s authority of funding and control. This period also witnessed a significant increase in the number of students admitted to the social work specialization, which helped to overcome the deficiency in qualified specialists. In addition, a small percentage, according to the system of quotas, were accepted into the social work masters’ programs, and several specialists completed their doctoral studies. These developments were due to several factors, including a relative development in Arab local government, the struggle for the
development of the social welfare departments within the Arab local authorities. As well as the increase in the number of Palestinian academics specializing in social work, and deepening their awareness of the needs and specificity of their community. In addition to internal changes in local government in general, and the government’s orientation to integrate Palestinian citizens into the Israeli economy, in particular, for reasons that are primarily related to the Israeli market.

It is worth noting that Minister Ora Namir refused to recognize the representation of the “Follow-up Committee for Social Affairs in the Arab Society” and appointed an adviser on Arab affairs. The Minister insisted on dealing with the Palestinian towns as individual cases rather than on a collective basis.


This period extended from when Yitzhak Herzog took over the Welfare and Social Services Ministry, until the beginning of the restructuring of the social welfare offices at the beginning of 2017. In this summary, we will draw on the important and recent reports of Sikkuy, the Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality, the Knesset Research and Information Center (Eido, 2017), and the “Taub Center” for Social Policies Study in Israel (Gal, Madhala and Bleikh, 2017).

This period was characterized by Minister Yitzhak Herzog’s attempt to “bridge the gaps” in the social services offered to Palestinian citizens, just like the Jews, on three levels:
first, to increase resources through the use of –somewhat– objective and transparent criteria in the distribution of budgets. Second, to enhance the participation of Arabs in the decision-making and policy-making related to the Palestinian citizens, through continued consultation with representatives of the “Arab Social Services Directors Forum”. Thirdly, partial recognition of the need to harmonize certain services to the specificity of Palestinian citizens.

Despite these attempts, the above three reports indicate that the social welfare offices in the Arab community continue to suffer from several shortcomings and obstacles to their effectiveness. The most important of which are: limited resources; constricted coverage of needs; wasting of time in pursuing issues of protection laws of all types; limited dealing with the scourge of poverty; structural weakness in taking initiatives and renewal; privatization of service delivery; introduction of commercial or voluntary elements into the mainstream of social work. This indicates that the absence of distributive justice, and adherence to the principle of equality in the distribution of resources, which is unaccomplished, confirms that the State’s policies in dealing with the Palestinian social scene are still moving within the orientalist framework, dealing with the Palestinians as sects, clans and geographic regions. This is observed, for example, but not limited to, in the police’s dealings with violence and crime in the Palestinian community inside Israel.

Following the development of social services in the Palestinian minority under the State’s policies, from its inception to the current period, leads to the conclusion that the social welfare
offices in the Arab community are characterized by the lack of subterfuge and limitations, to the point of disability, in dealing with the needs and problems of the target groups, or even just dealing with them. Consequently, Palestinian citizens continue to suffer from high rates of extreme and persistent poverty, declared and masked unemployment, deep gaps, widespread crime, including domestic violence, increasing numbers of alcoholics, gambling and drug addicts, family disintegration, and increase of multi-crisis families, as well as the typical needs of each demographic segment.
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117 years of Nakbah
Mada al-Carmel - The Arab Center for Applied Social Research is a non-profit, independent research institute founded in 2000 and located in Haifa, Israel. Inspired by concern for its human and national development, Mada al-Carmel aims to promote theoretical and applied research on the Palestinian community in Israel. Mada al-Carmel focuses on the social, educational, and economic needs of Palestinians in Israel, as well as on national identity and democratic citizenship. Broader issues of identity, citizenship, and democracy in multi-ethnic states are also addressed.