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The Palestinian Arabs constituted a majority of the population in Palestine before 1948, numbering approximately 1,300,000 people. There were 874,000 to 940,000 Palestinians who lived on the eighty percent of historic Palestine that became Israel (Rouhana, 1997). The Nakba (or "catastrophe") of 1948 resulted in the dispossession and expulsion of 714,150 to 744,150 Palestinian Arabs, or eighty to eighty-four percent of the Palestinian population. These people were dispossessed of their lands and became refugees.[1] The refugee population consisted of three different groups: 390,000 rural inhabitants, 254,000 urban residents, and 70,000 to 100,000 semi-nomadic Bedouins (Khalidi, 1992). Almost overnight, the bulk of the Palestinian population was displaced. The 156,000 Palestinians who remained in the part of Palestine now called Israel became a minority in an exclusively Jewish state. Between twenty-five to thirty percent of the Palestinians who remained became internally displaced persons (Wakim, 2001).[2]

Villagers relied primarily on agriculture before 1948. Villages were characterized by small estates and common lands which peasants took turns in cultivating. The size, population, wealth and crop yield of the different villages varied significantly depending on soil quality, water resources, and distances from main provincial towns. Most villages were undergoing social and political transformations in education as well as in diversification of the local economy, particularly in the service sector. There was also a marked trend of cooperative promotion of village products. Religion played an important role in daily life. Each village had a church or a mosque as well as shrines of local saints, which

1.
Khalidi explains the discrepancy between estimations of the number of Palestinian refugees as being partly due to differing assessments of Bedouin refugees. The numbers quoted above are less than those documented in sources such as Abu-Lughod (Abu-Lughod, 1971, pp. 155-161). Abu Lughod estimates that between 770,000 and 780,000 Palestinians were displaced in 1948. Different estimations may also be due to Abu Lughod's use of British Government documents such as *The General Monthly Bulletin XII* of December 1947, whereas Khalidi's statistics are calculated from a variety of Arabic, English, and Hebrew primary and secondary sources.

2.
For the UN definition of Internally Displaced Persons, see: http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html. For further information on internally displaced Palestinians, go to "Internally Displaced" section at Mada's website: (www.mada-research.org).

served as defining characteristics of village life and collective memory.

During the Nakba, Zionist forces expelled Palestinians from approximately 512 villages (Abu Sittah, 1998). After expelling the villagers, Zionist forces confiscated village property (houses, churches, mosques, cemeteries, fields, orchards, cattle grazing trails) and divided it among neighboring Jewish settlements or earmarked it for new Jewish settlements. The names of the new settlements were replaced with Hebrew renditions that often closely resembled the original Arabic, for example the village of Saffuriyya was named Zippori (Khalidi, 1992).

The majority of Palestinians were expelled from urban centers such as Acre, Bisan, Lydda, Ramleh, Beersheba, Majdal, Tiberias, Haifa, West Jerusalem, and Jaffa. Palestinians were the majority population in centers such as Tiberias, Haifa, West Jerusalem, and the old port city of Jaffa. After the Nakbah, Nazareth and Shafa Amr were the sole remaining Arab centers; they absorbed a large number of refugees displaced from surrounding villages. The real estate of these urban centers: commercial centers, residential quarters, schools, banks, hospitals, clinics, mosques, churches, public buildings, and parks became the property of the nascent state. The private property of the Palestinian urban middle class such as furniture, jewelry, artworks, and libraries were also confiscated (Khalidi, 1992; Rouhana 1997).

Within a period of months, there was a complete transformation of the demographic, economic, social, cultural, and political life that had been alive and well in historic Palestine.[3] On the one hand, Jewish colonial settlement was intensified and spread its control over Palestine's natural resources. On the other hand, the original Palestinian inhabitants were marginalized, displaced, and isolated.

Israel was declared as a simultaneously Jewish and democratic state in 1948. Israel's democracy was from this moment on limited to its Jewish citizens, effectively exclud-

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3.
The Zionist colonial project resulted in the destruction of all Arab political parties functioning in historic Palestine. The one exception was the Communist Party which had historically Arab and Jewish membership but played an important role in political and social advocacy and mobilizing for Palestinian rights post 1948.

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ing the rights of the Palestinian minority and the Palestinian Diaspora. This fact is perhaps most clearly articulated in the "Law of Return" which provides any Jewish person, wherever he or she may live, with some minor exceptions, the right to "return" to Israel and become a citizen while indigenous Palestinians and their descendants are denied the internationally recognized right of return.[4]

The Israeli authorities have consistently articulated the importance of maintaining the Jewish character of the state, despite the presence of a significant Palestinian minority. Successive governments have consistently rejected Palestinians as a national minority and as typical to colonial praxes have sought to fragment and suppress their collective identity. The category of "Palestinian citizens" is absent in Israeli state language. Many official state documents refer to the Palestinian minority as the "non-Jewish population." Other documents as well as the media and other forms of public discourse identify Palestinians as "Israeli Arabs" or divide the community into bifurcated religious and ethnic groups: Muslims, Christians, Druze or Bedouins rather than as a collective minority. Israel was successful to a certain extent in bifurcating some of the Druze and Bedouin people from the Palestinian minority. Druze men and a portion of Bedouin men were enlisted in the Israeli Army. It is important to note, however, that in both these communities, there are strong voices opposing policies of separation and exclusion from the Palestinian minority.

The state has taken systematic steps to marginalize and exclude Palestinians from public life as well as severely limiting the minority's autonomy of their own social and political structures and affairs. The state has also implemented various apparatuses of monitoring and control, impeding the emergence of independent Palestinian institutions and organization.

The Israeli state has historically understood Palestinian citizens as a security threat or a "fifth column" in the context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel has effectively been under a state of emergency from 1948 until

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4.
The right of Palestinian refugees and their descendants to return to the homes they were displaced from is an internationally recognized right, and enshrined in United Nations Resolution 194. For more information on this resolution, please visit http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/un-resolution-194.html

today. The Palestinians who remained in Israel, while formally given citizenship in the Jewish state, were placed under direct military administration[5] until 1966. Palestinian citizens were subject to severe restrictions on movement, political organization, employment, and publications. During this period the state confiscated lands in a number of official and unofficial ways.[6] The Palestinian peasantry was transformed into a "lumpenproleteriat" and the emergence of a viable bourgeoisie was made impossible (Zureik, 1979).

The military administration also had implications on the political and social framework of Palestinian society. Given the absence of national Palestinian social or political leadership, Israeli state policy was to enforce and reproduce traditional structures such as the hamula (extended family). By coopting the hamula leadership, the state was able to control social and political life. The state-appointed mukhtar (or mayor) was the only connection between the state and the Palestinian minority. The patriarchal and traditional hamula structure allowed for the effective control over the Palestinian public sphere and limited the participation and social activism of women (Kimmerling & Migdal, 193; Lustick,1980).

The very detail of Palestinian daily life was impacted and a climate of fear was instilled. Collective punishment was not uncommon, as evidenced by the massacre of Kufr Qassim which took place in 1956. On the 29th of October, at the beginning of the Suez War, the military administration issued a curfew on all Arab villages. The peasant men and women working in the fields of Kufr Qassem had not received word and returned to their homes after curfew. Israeli soldiers fired at the peasants returning from the fields, killing forty-seven men, women, and children (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993)

Military administration was a period of isolation for Palestinians inside Israel, at the same time that it was essential in the formation of their experience. Palestinians were attempting to deal simultaneously with their isolation from the Arab world and their new reality as a minority living on

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5.
Various literature refers to this period as the "military rule" or "military government" the terms "rule" and "government" have legal connotations and legitimizes Israel state practices vis-a`-vis the Palestinian population. In this paper, I refer to the period as the military administration, which more accurately depicts the state apparatus, its practices, and its various violations of Palestinians rights.

6.
The amount of Palestinian land confiscated is estimated between 4.5 to 5.5 million dunams. The United Nations reported in 1962 (Jaryous Report) that the amount of land confiscated was 5.2 million, not including the Beersheba area. In addition to these initial confiscations, more than half of the lands of the Palestinians that remained in what is now called Israel, was confiscated. Palestinians in Israel own approximately 3.5 percent of the land in Israel. Thus the process of land confiscation continues until today. The state constituted a land apparatus which did not only convert confiscated land into state property, but also made it the collective property of the Jewish people all over the world. This process was administered by the coordinated efforts of international Jewish organizations, including the Israel Land Authority and the Jewish Agency. These organizations had established a strong base in anchoring the Zionist community in Palestine before 1948, and expanded after the declaration of the state. The Israel Land Authority had a central role in the state and continued to confiscate lands. The Jewish Agency continued establishing Jewish settlements, expanding state infrastructure for the absorption for incoming Jewish immigrants (Yiftachel, 2001). It should be noted that this process was not one of utopic land nationalization, it was rather a process of pillaging the property of the country's indigenous inhabitants and transferring it to the Jewish collective. Indeed this process was consistent with and necessary to the establishment of a state of the Jewish people. The state of Israel today owns approximately 93 percent of the land inside the green line. Approximately 3.5 percent of the land is private Jewish property.

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their own land. Venues, such as the Cairene radio broadcast "the Voice of the Arabs," that connected the community to the political events of the region, were awaited with great enthusiasm. It was not until the late sixties that television became an additional source of information.

The few Arab leaders that remained after the Nakba, played an important role in organizing resistance to the military administration. Most of the Arab leadership was organized within the Israeli Communist Party, the Arab-Jewish party whose roots started in the Communist parties in Historic Palestine. The Communist Party also played a central role in resisting Israeli policies toward the Palestinian citizens in issues such as land expropriation, freedom of expression, and discrimination in various fields of life. As an Israeli party, it provided a legal framework to Arab nationalist leaders to join it and act against Israeli policies. However, the relationship between the nationalist leaders and the Party witnessed some tension that has ebbed and flowed until now.

Towards the end of the fifties, Israeli institutional policy towards the Palestinians began to shift on certain levels. The Histadrut (the General Federation of Hebrew Workers in Eretz Israel) allowed for Palestinian membership in 1959. During this time, the group al-Ard (the Land) articulated one of the earliest organized expressions of Palestinian nationalist struggle. The group organized a party called the Socialist List that attempted to participate in Parliament elections in 1965 but was disqualified for ideological reasons. The Central Elections Commission, which was made up of party representatives, ruled that the Socialist List was unlawful because "its promoters deny the [territorial] integrity of the state of Israel and its very existence" (Peled, 1993). Most of al-Ard members were jailed or exiled (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993).

The lifting of military administration in 1966 meant increased movement and opportunities for employment and education for Palestinians in Israel.[7] The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased contact between

7.
One of the aims of ending military administration was to "protect" the labor market from inexpensive Palestinian labor that would compete with new Jewish immigrants (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993).

Palestinians on both lines of the 1967 green line. This contact enriched Palestinian nationalism among Palestinians in Israel after eighteen years of isolation from both the Palestinian people and the Arab world. Despite this newfound unity, the specificity of Palestinian citizens in Israel and their political and economic status became clear. The contact across the green line deepened Palestinian awareness of their political position as Israeli citizens. This position simultaneously afforded Palestinians a certain measure of individual rights while leaving them subject to a state apparatus that controlled every aspect of their lives. The Israeli use of "emergency regulations" was effective in limiting individual and collective rights even after military rule came to an end. The perception of Palestinian Arabs as enemies of the state thus continued long after the end of military administration . Policies of control and subjugation have taken new forms and permutations.

In the beginning of the seventies, there was an escalation in the establishment of Palestinian national organizations in Israel. This included student associations at university and high school levels, the National Committee of the Arab Councils and Mayors, the National Committee for Defense of Arab Land (Bishara, 1993). In 1977, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), which was made up of the Communist Party and others, was established (Rouhana, Saleh and Sultany, 2004). One of its main demands was equality between Jews and Arabs. The DFPE played an essential role in opposing Israeli governmental policy, strengthening Palestinian consciousness, and leading Palestinian political resistance. For several years, the DFPE was the central party among Palestinians in Israel. Although party leadership consisted of both Arab and Jewish individuals, the majority of its voters were Palestinians. In 1977, for example, approximately fifty one percent of the Palestinian population voted DFPE after decades of voting for the Israeli parties of Mapai and Labor (Rouhana *et al*, 2004; Rouhana, 1997).

The seventies also witnessed the emergence of the secular nationalist Abnaa Al-Balad (Sons of the Country)

movement which considers itself a stream of the Palestinian National Movement. Its political program calls for the establishment of a secular Palestinian state on the whole territory of historic Palestine. This movement, since its inception, emphasizes the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. It is worth mentioning that sections of this movement continue boycotting the Knesset elections until today.

During this very period of increased political and social organizing in the seventies, discrimination and control emerged for the first time as Israeli official policy towards the Palestinian minority. This official policy was clearly articulated in the "Koenig Report," which was leaked to the press and published in the Hebrew language newspaper Al Hamishmar in July, 1976. This report presented an oppressive ideological position towards the Palestinians in Israel and resulted in recommendations to the government on the best ways to control the Palestinian minority (Sa'di, 2003).

Despite the policies of control and repression, Palestinians consistently resisted Israeli hegemony. The significant historical events of Land Day March 30th 1976 exemplify this protracted struggle. The National Committee for Defense of Arab Land, the first organization to represent the entire Palestinian community in Israel, called for a national strike in response to the confiscation of Palestinian land in the Galilee.   The state's confiscation of these lands was part of the planned "Judaization of the Galilee," released in February 1976 (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993). Palestinian citizens in Israel took collective national action and as a result of the strike and various demonstrations, five Palestinian men and one woman were killed, many wounded and hundreds arrested. Land Day has since become a national day commemorated by the Palestinian people collectively in Israel, in the West Bank and Gaza, and in the Diaspora (Rouhana, 1997).

Additional efforts to organize among the Palestinian minority were articulated in their participation in the Congress of the Arab Community in 1980. This Congress aimed at setting a political program and agenda expressing Arab

consensus, specifically on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli authorities used emergency regulations to stop this Congress from happening; consequently it has come to be known as the "Forbidden Congress" (Rouhana, 1997).

In 1982, the National Committee of the Arab Councils and Mayors met with Arab Knesset Members and established the Follow Up Committee. This Committee aimed at dealing with the various crises in local Arab councils and calling for a greater share of government resources. This Committee became a source of national leadership. It was renamed the Committee to Follow Up on the Concerns of Arab Citizens and expanded to include Arab members of the Histadrut central and executive committees, the National Committee for Defense of Arab Land, the Regional Union of Arab University Students, the Regional Committee of Secondary Arab Students, and representatives from voluntary and national educational, health, and social organizations. In the late eighties the Committee also included representatives of Arab political parties (Mharib, 1998). Despite appearances of wide national representation, many Committee members' reliance on traditional local alliances resulted in the absence of women's participation as well as truncated possibilities for drafting a national vision (Rouhana and Ghanem, 1993).

In the beginning of the eighties the Palestinian minority began to take collective and public actions in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and in the Diaspora. In 1981, for example, Land Day was declared a day of solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and a day of resistance to Israeli oppression. In 1982, a national strike was declared in solidarity with the Palestinians massacred in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. These expressions of solidarity were further escalated with the beginning of the first intifada in 1987. The first intifada was a transformative moment for the Palestinian minority (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993; Rouhana, 1997). The Palestinian minority not only expressed their solidarity with there brethren under the occupation (by sending food and money and through strikes and demonstrations) but increas-

ingly identified their own struggle as part of a wider Palestinian cause.

Increased politicization and identification with the Palestinian cause was reflected in internal politics. In the mid eighties, a few months before parliamentary elections, the Progress List for Peace (PLP) emerged on the political scene. Despite opposition from the state's security apparatus, the Supreme Court ruled the PLP a legal list legitimate to run in Knesset elections. The PLP was the first "legal" political party, outside of the DFPE, that declared its full solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The PLP was distinguished by its insistence on national Palestinian identity, as well as its nationalist analysis - as opposed to the DFPE's class analysis - of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The PLP was made up of local Arab nationalist organizations and some left-wing Jewish individuals (Pappe, 1999; Rouhana, 1997).

The Islamic movement emerged on the local scene during the same period. In addition to participating in local elections, the Islamic movement established a network of organizations, especially in Umm al-Fahem, that provided drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers, free health clinics, sports activities, and other services that were to a certain extent absent among the Palestinian community. The Islamic movement's politics are in line with Palestinian politics and demands; calling for equality between Jews and Arabs, confining political and organizing within the framework of the law, and supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The Islamic movement split in 1996 over the issue of participation in Knesset elections (Rouhana, 1997; Rouhana *et al*, 2001).

The Oslo accords of the early nineties had wide ranging implications on how the Palestinian people could imagine their future. The majority of the Palestinian minority in Israel supported the Oslo accords as a first step to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, the accords raised a number of questions for Palestinians inside Israel about their future, especially since the negotiations between Israel and the Pal-

estinian Liberation Organization did not address the question of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Questions of the Palestinian minority's relationship to the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority and what the future may hold were heatedly debated in the press and amidst the political elite.

The Initiative Committee Defending the Rights of Internally Displaced Arabs in Israel was established in the context of these discussions. This Committee declared its commitment to the right of the internally displaced to return to their homes and villages. It also called for the repeal of Israeli laws which violate international law and label the internally displaced as "absentees." In 1996, four years after its establishment, the Committee declared itself as the representative of the internally displaced Palestinians in Israel. After registering as a legal organization the Committee was renamed the Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced (ADRID) (Wakim, 2001).

In 1996, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was established. The NDA brought together a variety of different political, intellectual, feminist and student movements that included the Covenant for Equality, as well as sections of the PLP and of Abnaa Al-Balad, the Jafra Student Movement, and others (Rouhana et al, 2003). The NDA takes a Palestinian nationalist approach to its political work. In demanding "a state for all its citizens," the NDA poses a challenge to the self-definition of Israel as simultaneously Jewish and democratic.

In 2000, when the second intifada began, Palestinians in Israel expressed their solidarity with the Palestinian's living under military occupation. Demonstrations and marches in Palestinian centers like Nazareth and Umm al-Fahem were some of the largest in the community's history. In October of that year, Israeli police fired at a group of demonstrators, killing thirteen Palestinian citizens of Israel and wounding hundreds of others. Since Palestinians confined their political action to the legal boundaries of the state, some in the community were shocked to realize that the state would use the same force against them as the occupied non-citizen Pal-

estinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This period was referred to in Israeli public discourse as the "October events," in an expression of state and public attempts to separate Palestinian resistance inside the green line from Palestinian resistance in the West Bank and Gaza.

In November 2000, Palestinian lawyers, organizers, and institutions succeeded in lobbying the Israeli government to appoint a commission of inquiry, headed by a Supreme Court justice, to investigate the "October events". The Official Commission of Inquiry, or the Orr Commission, was to "investigate how the events developed; determine the facts of, and draw conclusions about what happened; and investigate the factors that led to the events, including the behavior of inciters and organizers from all sectors of society and from the security forces" (Official Commission of Inquiry, 2003). Thus, the Orr Commission, before even beginning investigation had criminalized Palestinians as "inciters." Its mandate was therefore not to investigate the killing of thirteen civilians, but rather to investigate "factors" and "behaviors" of not simply the police yielding guns but "all sectors of society." The Committee of Martyrs' Families, which was made up of the families of the thirteen citizens who were killed, was central to demanding a commission of inquiry. Ultimately, however, they boycotted the proceedings. The boycott was initiated for a number of reasons. Families' participation in the proceedings was severely restricted; families could not attend the trials and they could not contribute to questioning witnesses. In addition, the Commission did not identify the specific officers responsible for the deaths of the thirteen Palestinians.

The Orr Commission's final report, published in September 2003, addressed state discrimination in the "Arab sector" in various areas. The Commission presented recommendations on police and security forces' actions. However, they placed a portion of the responsibility of the events which lead to the death of thirteen Palestinian citizens on the "Arab leadership" for not containing and confining demonstrations and marches.[8] The results of the Orr Commission reflect the Israeli policy of providing a certain amount of liberal con-

8.
 For more information on the establishment of the Orr Commission and its recommendation, or further legal analysis, visit: www.adalah.org

cessions (i.e. recognition of discrimination) at the same time that it legitimizes and legalizes state repression. Thus, the Israeli legal system places a ceiling on assuring justice. For this reason Palestinians lawyers, institutes, and organizations are increasingly referring to international organizations and frameworks in their demands for equal rights and justice.

In 2001, for the first time in the state's history, over eighty percent of the Palestinian citizens boycotted state elections, namely the race for prime minister (Rouhana *et al*, 2004). This was a particularly significant event, since the Palestinian community had played an important role in the prior election of Ehud Barak as prime minister in 1999. The boycott was a collective national action in solidarity with the second intifada and in protest of the state's violent response to Palestine citizens' demonstrations.

Summary

The Palestinians in Israel have experienced a rich and complex historical trajectory. In the first two decades after the establishment of the state of Israel, they were almost completely isolated from the Palestinian people and the Arab world. Israel controlled every aspect of this community's social, political, and daily life. Despite this policy of complete control, there were continuous efforts to resist Israeli hegemony. In 1967 the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza revived contact between Palestinians on both sides of the green line. The Palestinian minority in Israel increasingly identified with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The vision of a shared Palestinian cause was intensified. At the same time, this contact with a portion of the Palestinian people brought to light many of the differences between the two communities. This contact as well as global and regional transformations clarified to the Palestinian minority the problematics and specificities of their Israeli citizenship. In the sixties and seventies the Palestinians successfully established political and social organizations that audibly called for change. They called for full participation in all state institutions, including the state's land authorities and its urban planning councils and other apparati that are considered out of the scope of Palestinian influence.

This process of institution building continues until today and is part of an effort to call for full Palestinian national, social, and political rights. Palestinians are now calling for their collective rights including: control over their educational system, state recognition of Arab national organizations, the right to establish an Arab university, and a proportional share of the national resources. These demands, as well as the very existence of approximately one million Palestinian citizens in Israel, pose a clear and lasting challenge to Israel's self-definition as both a Jewish and democratic state.

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